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Abstract 
The pursuit of weapons which distance the soldier from the actual battlefield 
has been going on ever since the transition from the waging of war using short 
blades, to the waging of war using bow and arrow. Today, that ambition has 
reached an almost completion with the ever-increasing number of unmanned, 
remote-controlled vehicles that are rapidly becoming the most common and 
prominent method of waging wars. Political incentives of cutting costs of 
warfare and sparing the lives of soldiers create the last push towards full 
autonomy. The emergence of increasingly autonomous weapons (AWs) has 
already generated a heated debate on the legality of these weapons, and two 
very polarized sides can be easily discerned.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine and analyze this debate, to look into 
the arguments put forth regarding the legality or illegality of autonomous 
weapons, and examine where the positions are in the debate. Focus is on the 
three fundamental principles in International Humanitarian Law (IHL): 
distinction, proportionality and precaution, and I discuss the arguments in 
both directions. Proponents often claim the ability of AWs to comply with 
IHL, with the development of sensors, algorithms, software and artificial 
intelligence (AI), which would allow the machine to satisfactorily distinguish 
between civilians and combatants, carry out proportionality assessments and 
to take the required precautions in its actions. Opponents instead argue that 
the development of AI has overpromised before, that sensors could never be 
able to distinguish between civilians and combatants in a contemporary 
battlefield and that proportionality and precaution assessments require a 
contextual understanding that only humans are capable of. The fundamental 
disagreement seems to lie in the uncertainty of the development of the 
software and technology, and the capability of machines to perform as well, 
or better than, humans. The issue of accountability is also examined in terms 
of what happens with the responsibility for breaches of IHL when we have 
assigned the task of targeting and firing, essentially, the life-and-death 
decision, to a machine. Different propositions such as placing the 
accountability onto the commander, programmer, manufacturer or even the 
machine itself are discussed. Issues relating to the moral and ethical aspects 
of changing the agents of war from humans to robots are also examined, and 
the possible consequences this might entail – both from a separate moral 
perspective and as part of the legality assessment, in terms of what would 
happen with the applicability of IHL if we would change the agents in war. 
 
After having examined the debate on legality of AWs, some concluding 
remarks are drawn on what we are to do with the debate in the near future, 
where I present some of the more prominently discussed ways forward in 
terms of handling the emergence of these weapons. Finally, I end with some 
of my own reflections on what I have found in my analysis of the current 
debate, and what I believe are the more important aspects to continue 
discussing in the ongoing debate on the legality of autonomous weapons.  
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Sammanfattning 
Jakten på vapen som distanserar soldaten från själva slagfältet har pågått ända 
sedan övergången från krigsföring med knivar till krigsföring med pil och 
båge. Idag har denna ambition närapå nått fullständighet med det ständigt 
växande antal obemannade, fjärrstyrda farkoster som snabbt håller på att bli 
den vanligaste och mest framstående metoden att föra krig. Politiska 
incitament såsom att kapa kostnader av krig och att spara soldaters liv innebär 
den sista knuffen mot full autonomi. Framväxten av alltmer autonoma 
vapensystem har redan genererat en passionerad debatt om lagligheten av 
dessa vapen, och två väldigt polariserade sidor är enkelt urskiljbara.  
 
Syftet med det här arbetet är att undersöka och analysera den här debatten, att 
titta på de argument som förs fram gällande lagligheten eller olagligheten av 
autonoma vapen, och att undersöka var positionerna står i debatten. Fokus 
ligger på de tre grundläggande principerna i internationell humanitärrätt 
(IHL): distinktion, proportionalitet och försiktighet, och jag diskuterar 
argumenten i båda riktningarna. Förespråkarna framhäver ofta förmågan hos 
autonoma vapen att efterleva reglerna i IHL, genom utvecklingen av sensorer, 
algoritmer, mjukvara och artificiell intelligens (AI), vilket skulle göra det 
möjligt för maskinen att på ett tillfredsställande sätt skilja mellan civila och 
kombattanter, genomföra proportionalitets-bedömningar samt att företa 
nödvändiga försiktighetsåtgärder i sina aktiviteter. Motståndarna menar 
istället att utvecklingen av AI har lovat för mycket förut, att sensorer aldrig 
skulle kunna skilja mellan civila och kombattanter i ett nutida krigsfält och 
att bedömningar av proportionalitet och försiktighetsåtgärder kräver en 
kontextuell förståelse som endast människor kan klara av. Den grundläggande 
meningsskiljaktigheten verkar ligga i ovetskapen om utvecklingen av 
mjukvara och teknologi, och förmågan hos maskinerna att utföra uppgifter 
lika bra som, eller bättre än, människor. Frågan om ansvar undersöks också 
gällande vad som händer med ansvaret för överträdelser av IHL när vi 
överlåter uppgiften av att sikta och avfyra, i allt väsentligt, liv och död-beslut, 
till en maskin. Olika förslag om var ansvaret ska placeras, såsom på 
befälhavaren, programmeraren, tillverkaren eller till och med på maskinen 
själv, diskuteras. Frågor som relaterar till de moraliska och etiska aspekterna 
av att byta ut agenterna i krig från människor till robotar undersöks också, 
och de möjliga konsekvenser detta innebär – både från ett separat moraliskt 
perspektiv, men också som del av laglighetsbedömningen, beträffande vad 
som händer med tillämpligheten av IHL om vi byter agenterna i krig. 
 
Efter att ha undersökt debatten om laglighet av autonoma vapen drar jag några 
slutsatser om hur vi ska fortsätta debatten i den nära förestående framtiden, 
där jag presenterar några av de mest diskuterade möjliga vägarna framåt när 
det gäller att hantera framväxten av dessa vapen. Slutligen avslutar jag med 
några egna reflektioner om vad jag har kommit fram till i min analys av 
debatten, och vad jag tror är de viktigaste aspekterna att bära med sig i den 
fortsatta debatten om lagligheten av autonoma vapen.  
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Abbreviations 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
AP I-II Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions I-II of 8 June 1977 
AW Autonomous Weapon 
AWS   Autonomous Weapon System 
CCW Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons of October 
10 1980 
CIHL Customary International 
Humanitarian Law 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency 
DoD US Department of Defense 
GC I-IV The Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 I-IV 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HRW Human Rights Watch 
ICC   International Criminal Court 
ICJ   International Court of Justice 
ICRAC International Committee for Robot 
Arms Control 
ICRC International Committee of the Red 
Cross 
IHL   International Humanitarian Law 
IHRC International Human Rights Clinic 
at Harvard Law School 
MoD   UK Ministry of Defense 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization 
SCI   Strategic Computing Initiative 
UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UGV   Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
UK   United Kingdom 
UN   United Nations 
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
US   United States of America 
WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WWI   World War I 
WWII   World War II 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Wars are changing. This is hardly anything new, but something that has been 
prevalent throughout history. During the 20th century, the development of 
wars saw an unprecedented revolution – from the trenches of World War I, to 
the development of aerial warfare during World War II, from the development 
of nuclear wars at the end of WWII, to the rise of guerrilla warfare in the 
1970s and 80s, from battlefields protecting civilian lives, to battlefields using 
civilians as human shields, from traditional interstate conflicts, to a post-9/11 
context with a multitude of actors and battlefields. Our changing world has 
led to our changing wars, and where the rapid development of our world is 
going, so will the rapid development of wars follow.  
 
One particular aspect of the evolution of warfare, has been the pursuit of 
distancing soldiers from the actual heat of battle as far as possible. Warfare 
has moved from short blades to long spears, from long spears to bow and 
arrow, from bow and arrow to cannons, from cannons to aerial bombing, from 
aerial bombing to cruise missiles.1 Most notably, the development of air-
power came to change the battlefield tremendously, and with this, military 
research came to focus mainly on how to further develop the use of air-power. 
During the 20th century, efforts to remote control aircrafts surged and several 
prototypes were flown both by the United States (US), British and German 
armies.2 Since then, the automation of weapons and weapon systems has 
escalated, due to pressure to cost-cut from an increasingly diminished military 
budget, and a motivation of not risking the lives of soldiers which would lead 
to a more politically accepted war-waging.  
 
However, the rise of military robotics is not without obstacles – sceptics are 
rapidly becoming more and more vocal in their concerns about both the 
legality and ethicality of autonomous weapons (AWs)3 and the implications 
that they could have on future warfare. In the pursuit of more cost-effective 
weapons, weapons that save more lives, weapons that will not risk the lives 
of the soldiers – weapons that will be more politically accepted – it seems that 
the proponents are skipping important parts of the discussion of these 
weapons; not only the legal implications of today, but also the bigger impact 
and bigger picture of these weapons of tomorrow. The balance between what 
                                                 
1 Sharkey, Noel “Saying ‘No’! to Lethal Autonomous Targeting” in Journal of Military 
Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2010, p. 369. 
2 Krishnan, Armin Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons, Ashgate 
Publishing, 2009, pp. 15-19. 
3 In short, AWs can be described as a weapon system that, once deployed, can carry out its 
mission autonomously, make decisions and address issues that arise along the way, and on 
its own, take targeting and firing decisions. 
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is scary in this development and what is militarily advantageous, is far from 
being struck and this unresolved issue will continue to influence the debate.  
 
In general, the debate can be summed up in saying that the proponents of AWs 
emphasizes the advantage of machines over humans in their campaigns, and 
the superiority of machines in many aspects, such as human fallibilities in 
processing information, lower response times, fatigue etc.4 – they are more 
desirable from a military point of view. The opponents instead emphasizes 
the adherence to international humanitarian law and the inability of the 
weapons to comply with the fundamental principles therein, as well as the 
ethicality and morality of using robots in war and taking the human 
completely out of the loop, and most importantly, letting machines make life-
or-death decisions.5   
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the legality of autonomous weapons, 
and more specifically, the current debate on the legality of autonomous 
weapons. The main question in the debate is if and how autonomous weapons 
can comply with the fundamental principles of International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL); the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. After 
examining the arguments regarding the legality, I will move on to the sub-
question, if these weapons are not able to comply with current IHL, or if 
information and detail on the compliance is insufficient, how are we to treat 
these new weapons and their legal status?  
 
The point of departure will be in the current situation, where there are two 
strong sides to the use of AWs – the proponents and the opponents. Both sides 
are strong advocates for their cause, but both sides lack an objective 
argumentation in order to convince the reader of the claims of each respective 
side. Both sides tend to get overly subjective in their arguments, and tend to 
miss out on addressing the opposing side's arguments, thus giving the 
impression that each side is only interested in giving its own perspective, and 
not providing the full image.  
 
One of the motivations for this thesis is to provide a more objective overlook 
of the debate and compare and value the arguments of each side in relation to 
the core issues that arise with AWs, in order to understand the debate and 
ultimately, where the disagreement lies. The purpose is thus rather to provide 
an overlook and not necessarily to come to an actual conclusion on legality. I 
will examine both sides of the debate and aim to keep the analysis as objective 
as possible. Nevertheless, in a polarized debate it is inevitable to stay 
completely objective, and as the debate leans back and forth, so will my 
reflections and conclusions. Furthermore, I will examine the situation where, 
                                                 
4 Krishnan (2009), pp. 40-42. 
5 Asaro, Peter “On banning autonomous weapon systems: human rights, automation, and the 
dehumanization of lethal decision-making” in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 
94, No. 886, Summer 2012, pp. 699-701. 
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if it is not possible to determine the legality of AWs (because of the limited 
amount of information and specificities of AWs today), what are we going to 
do with them and how are we to treat them? Perhaps a regulatory framework 
would be the best way forward in this situation? To leave a weapon system 
of this magnitude unregulated, even during its development phase, could 
possibly prove disastrous, as it could lead to unlimited proliferation and use 
of these weapons, in situations that were not even imaginable in the 
development.  
 
Throughout the thesis, the underlying notion will at all times be the protection 
of civilians, and this is the reason why focus will be on these parts of IHL. 
Conversely, I will disregard other aspects that AWs will pose, such as the 
relation between robot and commander (e.g. the case of when a robot does 
not obey orders from the commander and the issues that may arise), and more 
technological aspects and issues of AWs that will not be relevant for the 
examination of AWs from a legal perspective. 
1.3 Method and Material 
In this thesis, I will first and foremost be performing an analysis of the 
argumentation, keeping in mind the purposes of such an analysis – first, to 
describe the arguments and the debate, and second, to value the extent of how 
well the arguments put forward really support the position taken. In the 
analysis, the method of “pro-et-contra” will be used, in order to carry out the 
second purpose, of examining the value of the arguments.6 In this debate on 
AWs, the positions are very clear, thus the pro-side and the contra-side are 
easily identified, and the analysis there will consist of examining the 
sustainability of the argument, and its credence and relevance in the debate.7  
 
As mentioned above, the purpose is perhaps not so much to come to an actual 
conclusion regarding the legality in itself, as it is to come to a conclusion 
regarding the arguments put forward in this heated debate, and how we should 
be viewing this and what lessons and conclusions we can draw from the result 
of the debate, and how this can help us in the further discussion on AWs. In 
performing this overview and analysis of the debate and the relevant 
arguments put forth, I will however allow myself to sidestep the structure of 
the debate in one aspect, and discuss the aspect of morality and ethicality of 
AWs – an aspect often overlooked or even ignored in the debate. When an 
analysis of a debate is being done, it is important to bring up and analyze what 
is being discussed, but I also think it is important to bring up and analyze what 
is not being discussed – in the present case, the morality and ethicality.  
 
The materials used are mainly articles published in relevant scientific journals 
and books published in the field. Since the debate on the legality of AWs and 
the area of research in general is exceptionally new in character, the material 
                                                 
6 Bergström, Göran & Kristina Boréus (eds.) Textens Mening och Makt – Metodbok i 
Samhällsvetenskaplig Text- och Diskursanalys, 3rd ed., Studentlitteratur 2012, pp. 93-94. 
7 Ibid., p. 127. 
 8 
used is mainly based on the articles, as books tend to become dated fast within 
this field, whereas articles generally are more updated and are being published 
at a rate incomparable to that of books. To a limited extent, reports and studies 
from various organizations will also be used. With regards to the temporal 
aspect, the material I have used for the substantive parts of the thesis (i.e. 
publications) dates back no longer than to 2007, for the reasons mentioned 
above.  
 
I have chosen to focus on the publications by certain distinguished authors 
and scientists, such as Noel Sharkey, Professor of Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
and Robotics; Peter Asaro, Philosopher of Technology with a background in 
AI and robot vision research; Robert Sparrow, Professor of Political 
Philosophy and Applied Ethics; Michael N. Schmitt, Professor at the US 
Naval War College, Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Lt. Col. US Army and Military 
Professor at the US Naval War College; Matthew C. Waxman, Professor of 
Law and member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security 
and Law; Kenneth Anderson, Professor of International Law and member of 
the Hoover Institution’s Task Force, and Peter W. Singer, Director of the 
Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence with expertise on military 
technology and contemporary warfare. The reason for focusing on these 
authors is that they are all prominent in their respective field, as well as 
prominent internationally in the debate on AWs.8 
 
Research carried out in this field is of an inconclusive character. It is clear 
from the number of articles being produced, debates held and lobbying from 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) that it is a very current subject and 
a lot of studies and research on the development of military technology are 
being done. However, these studies are mostly carried out by the military 
branches and are therefore often (inherently) secret and confidential. At the 
same time, it is also important to note that the research has to be approached 
carefully and with caution, as it is often speculative and uncertain.  
 
Initially, the debate has been surrounding the issue of whether or not AWs 
will be able to comply with IHL, especially the principles of distinction and 
proportionality, as well as the sensitive area of accountability. However, the 
debate now seems to be shifting focus slightly, and with the evermore vocal 
calls for a preemptive ban,9 the focus of the international community today 
seems to be moving more towards the question of whether or not there should 
                                                 
8 For example, the Geneva Academy hosted a debate on “Autonomous Weapon Systems: 
Dangerous Killer Robots or Smarter and Less Harmful Warfare?” on 20 November 2013, 
between Matthew Waxman and Peter Asaro and moderated by Noam Lubell. The debate can 
be accessed at http://icrac.net/2013/11/geneva-academy-debate-matthew-waxman-vs-icracs-
peter-asaro/.  
9 Cf. e.g. Opinion – Viewpoint “UK roboticist Prof Noel Sharkey calls for a pre-emptive ban 
on the deployment of autonomous weapons” in The Engineer, 11 March 2013; Human Rights 
Watch and International Human Rights Clinic Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer 
Robots, November 2012, p. 1 (hereinafter HRW Report); Asaro (2012), p. 687. 
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be an international convention set in place that prohibits AWs altogether, or 
at least that regulates the development and use of them.10  
 
Furthermore, in order to understand the relevant material laws and 
regulations, I will for these parts of the thesis be employing the traditional 
legal method, i.e. examining material relevant for the field, analyzing it and 
drawing conclusions from my findings. This includes both current treaties and 
their commentary, case law (albeit limited) from the International Court of 
Justice, customary law and scientific research. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the thesis will have a mainly theoretical 
approach with regards to the discussion on AWs, because the amount of 
practical experience of these fully autonomous weapons is virtually non-
existent. I will however draw some experience from e.g. the use of drones and 
systems with limited autonomy, but the main parts of the thesis will remain 
theoretical. 
1.4 Delimitations 
In the discussion on compliance with IHL, I have limited my focus to three 
cardinal principles of IHL – distinction, proportionality and precaution. This 
decision is made partly due to their importance in the entire body of IHL and 
partly on the prevalence of which they are being discussed in the international 
debate on AWs. With regards to the discussion on accountability, I will not 
be discussing the matters of state responsibility for internationally wrongful 
acts, even if these wrongful acts are committed by autonomous systems 
belonging to that state, since the legal complexities of e.g. attributability is a 
separate matter from the aims of this thesis. Finally, related areas such as 
neuroscience in relation to weapons (“neuroweapons”) and performance-
enhancing technology such as e.g. exoskeletons (worn in movies such as 
Robocop and Iron Man) will also be disregarded in the thesis, while these 
areas relate to the question of the development of warfare and technology, 
they do not relate to autonomous weapons as such.11 
 
In the discussion on autonomous weapons, the question of drones will 
naturally arise, however, in this thesis I will not be addressing the matter of 
drones12. Today, current warfare is to a large extent already existing of 
remote-controlled weapon systems, or drones. They are considered the future 
of almost every air-force, and we are already at a place where not only states 
have access to drones. With the technology spreading ever faster, armed 
groups and insurgents have their own drones, and using easy instructions 
                                                 
10 Altmann, Jürgen et al. “Armed Military Robots: Editorial” in Ethics and Information 
Technology, Vol. 15, No. 2, 20 June 2013, p. 74; Asaro (2012), pp. 688-689.  
11 See e.g. Dahm, Werner J.A., US Air Force presentation “Technology Horizons: Vision 
for Air Force 2010-2030, Capabilities Enabled by Science & Technology”, Washington 
D.C., 25 June 2011, p. 15. 
12 I will however present a brief overview of remote-controlled weapons below, in chapter 
3.2. 
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found online, there is even the possibility to make your own drone.13 But we 
are already there, this is what happens today – what I am going to focus on is 
the next step, what happens after the drones? Therefore, the thesis will focus 
on the issue of autonomous weapons, where I will be discussing several 
different levels of autonomy, but primarily the development of what is being 
called full, or complete, autonomy.  
1.5 Structure 
This thesis will start with the second chapter where I will present a short 
overview of the vital parts of IHL that I will be discussing in relation to AWs 
and chapter three will provide the historic background as well as definitions 
of different autonomous weapons. These two chapters will serve as necessary 
backdrop for the examination that will follow in chapter four. Chapter four is 
by and large the core chapter of this thesis, and will offer an examination of 
the arguments on legality of these new weapons and their special features.14 
This will be the focal point where I examine the arguments put forward in the 
debate and show where the core disagreement on the legality of AWs lie. 
Chapter five will draw on chapter four for conclusions on the question posed 
in this first chapter. It will also examine some of the proposed ways forward 
in the debate on AWs, i.e. how we are to treat these weapons if we are not 
able to say anything for certain on the legality. Chapter six will to a certain 
extent summarize the findings from the previous chapters and offer some own 
reflections and concluding remarks. Reflections and my concluding remarks 
will primarily be found in the chapters assigned for this, however, some 
reflections will occur throughout the text as well.  
 
                                                 
13 Noam Lubell Speech on “Robot Warriors, Terrorists & Private Contractors: What Future 
for the Laws of War?” in Professorial Inaugural Lecture Series, University of Essex, 13 
December 2013. 
14 While I will present different kinds of autonomous weapons and discuss different levels of 
autonomy, the examination of legality will be on weapons with full, or complete autonomy. 
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2 Relevant International 
Humanitarian Law 
2.1 The Fundamental Principles of IHL 
The protection of civilian population and civilian objects is a principle that 
dates back to the very beginning of the waging of war, and the laws of this 
protection are highly developed and extensively codified, both in 
international and non-international armed conflicts. The purpose of waging a 
war to begin with is to defeat the enemy. In line with this, war-waging parties 
must respect the fundamental principle of military necessity – a combatant 
may only use the amount and kind of force necessary to defeat the enemy, to 
incapacitate the adversary and get them hors de combat, nothing else. Hence, 
the purpose is not in itself to kill the enemy, and any use of force more than 
what is required to partially or completely immobilize the enemy, is 
prohibited.15  
 
If the most fundamental principle in regards to combatants is to only use the 
amount of force necessary to render them defeated, the most fundamental 
principle in regards to civilians is that they should be protected at all times. 
For the purpose of protecting the civilian population in times of war, several 
fundamental principles exist. With regards to the examination of autonomous 
weapons that will follow, I will focus on the three principles of distinction, 
proportionality and precaution, as these three have specific relevance for the 
scope of the use of AWs. The purpose of this chapter is thus to provide a brief 
overview of the rules and norms of IHL that are relevant for understanding 
the debate and the arguments put forth on the legality of AWs. 
2.1.1 The Principle of Distinction 
Perhaps the most essential expression of the protection of civilians in times 
of war, is the principle of distinction, which has twofold requirements: firstly, 
to distinguish between civilians and combatants as well as civilian objects and 
military objectives, and secondly, to only direct attacks on the latter. The 
principle of distinction can be traced back to the St. Petersburg Declaration 
of 1868, which in its preamble states that the only legitimate object of warfare 
is to weaken the military forces of the enemy, implicitly illegitimizing attacks 
on civilians.16 In the Hague Regulation of 1907, Article 25 specifies that 
                                                 
15 Greenwood, Christopher “Humanitarian Requirements and Military Necessity” in The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, Dieter Fleck (ed.), 2nd ed., Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p. 35.  
16 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Saint Petersburg of 11 December 1868. 
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attacks on towns, villages, dwellings or buildings that are undefended are 
prohibited – implicitly protecting civilian lives and objects.17  
 
With regards to current treaty law, the principle is foremost found in Article 
48 in Additional Protocol (AP) I, which states that parties to the conflict at all 
times must distinguish between civilians and combatants as well as between 
civilian objects and military objectives, and only direct operations against the 
latter. This basic rule is set out in order to ensure respect for and protection 
of the civilian population and civilian objects in times of war. In addition to 
Article 48, the operational Articles 50 and 52 are necessary in defining the 
scope of civilian population and civilian objects, as well as regulating more 
specifically under which circumstances military objectives may be attacked. 
In Article 51(3) the rule creates an exception to the prohibition, and states that 
civilians who take a direct part in the hostilities are exempted from the 
protection and may therefore be lawfully attacked during such time as they 
directly participate – an exception that applies to all kinds of weapons.  
 
The importance of the principle of distinction also in customary law is first 
and foremost marked by the fact that the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) has established the principle as customary law through its study 
on Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL), and sets it out as rule 
number 1.18 Moreover, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, stated once 
and for all that the principle of distinction is one of the cardinal principles of 
humanitarian law, and that it constitutes an intransgressible principle of 
CIHL.19 Furthermore, in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), the deliberate attacking of civilians or civilian objects constitutes a war 
crime in both international and non-international armed conflicts.20 
2.1.2 The Principle of Proportionality 
Similar to the principle of distinction, the principle of proportionality is of 
vital importance in IHL. It demands the parties in conflict to ensure that their 
attacks are proportional, i.e. that the attacks that cause incidental loss of 
civilian life are not excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. 
Proportionality is a logical extension of the principle of distinction, and it is 
an expression of accepting that, while distinction should be upheld, it is 
impossible in wartime to avoid the loss of civilian life altogether. To this end, 
the principle of proportionality allows for a certain “collateral damage” in an 
                                                 
17 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague 18 October 1907. 
18 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie & Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 25. 
19 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion), 8 July 1996, paras. 78-
79. 
20 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC Statute) Articles 
8(2)(b)(i)-(ii) and 8(2)(e)(i)-(ii). 
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attack, if it is proportional to the anticipated military advantage to be gained 
from the attack. Evidently, the scope of what is an excessive loss of life and 
what is an anticipated advantage is impossible to define in general terms, and 
the balancing act it generates leaves an inevitable and considerable margin of 
appreciation in the assessment.21  
 
In the context of the Geneva Conventions (GCs), the principle is expressed in 
AP I Article 51(5)(b) where attacks that “may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated” are considered as indiscriminate and as 
such, prohibited.22 In determining the scope of “excessive”, the AP I does not 
provide any further guidance, and the 1987 commentary to the protocol only 
gives reference to the commentary of Article 57, as Article 57(2)(a)(iii) also 
reiterates the principle23, and merely states that the issue of proportionality 
poses a delicate problem. In some situations there might be no doubt, while 
in other situations hesitation might arise – the commentary finishes in noting 
that where such situations occur, the interest of the civilian population should 
prevail.24  
 
Therefore, in relation to the wording in AP I, the scope of the provision 
remains unclear which creates difficulties in the application, as it is subject to 
subjective assessment and margins of appreciation. Objective standards are 
non-existent, and the assessment is necessarily based on future effects of the 
attack, an assessment that will be made by the military which has to act and 
make decisions only on the basis of the information available at that specific 
time. In the ratification of the protocol, several states filed declarations saying 
that the decision taken by the responsible person must be judged on the 
information available at the time, and not on information in hindsight.25 In 
addition, the ICC Statute criminalizes disproportionate attacks in 
international conflicts, however not in non-international ones.26  
 
In customary law, the principle corresponds to rule 14 of the ICRC CIHL 
study, which concludes that state practice establishes this principle as a rule 
of CIHL and that it is applicable in international and non-international 
conflicts alike.27 The rule prohibits the launching of an attack that would 
cause excessive collateral damage, in the same wording as the provision set 
out in AP I Article 51, as mentioned above.  
                                                 
21 Oeter, Stefan “Methods of Combat” in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed 
Conflict, Dieter Fleck (ed.), 2008, p. 198. 
22 See AP I Article 51(4) “Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited”. 
23 Article 57 will be treated in chapter 2.1.3. 
24 Sandoz, Yvez, Christine Swinarski & Bruno Zimmerman (eds.), Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
ICRC 1987 (hereinafter Commentary AP I), comment no. 1979. 
25 Oeter (2008), p. 205. 
26 ICC Statute Articles 8(2)(b)(iv). 
27 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck (2005), p. 46. 
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2.1.3 The Principle of Precaution 
The third of the fundamental principles of IHL in the pursuit of protecting the 
civilian population and avoiding or minimizing civilian loss or damage is the 
principle of precaution. It widens the scope of considerations that need to be 
made before an attack, it requires constant care to be taken to spare the civilian 
population, and specifically, it requires the parties to take all feasible 
precaution when conducting military attacks, in order to not cause 
unnecessary or superfluous injury or suffering. Precaution is not least 
important in attacks by remote-controlled weapons as the danger of military 
excessive collateral damage is exceptionally high with these weapons, even 
if recent technology development has improved the accuracy of targeting in 
these weapons.28  
 
In treaty law, the principle of precaution first appeared in the 1907 Hague 
Convention (IX) Article 2(3), which required the commander to take all due 
measures to cause as little harm as possible.29 Within the scope of the GCs, 
the principle is found in AP I Article 57. In the commentary to Article 57, 
special attention is drawn to the requirement in sub-paragraph 2(a)(i) of 
Article 57, that of properly identifying the objectives to be attacked as military 
objectives, and states that this identification should be carried out with the 
greatest of care, especially when the objective is located at a great distance. It 
also mentions that in those cases where there is the slightest doubt, the call 
for additional information and/or further reconnaissance is necessary to fulfill 
the requirements set out.30  
 
One important aspect mentioned in the commentary is that in the cases of 
objectives located at a distance, reconnaissance is often carried out by aerial 
units and that the evaluation of this information must include a serious check 
of accuracy, noting the risk of the enemy setting up fake military objectives 
or concealing the true ones.31 The extent of “everything feasible” was not 
further explained through the commentary, and it seems as if the 
interpretation is “everything practicable or practically possible”, and that 
interpretation and application has to be a matter of common sense and good 
faith.32  
 
The other important aspect codified in Article 57 is that of choosing a means 
of attack “with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing” collateral 
damage33, as well as where there is a choice in the attack, to select the military 
objective that would generate the least collateral damage.34 In general, this 
                                                 
28 Oeter (2008), p. 190.  
29 Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, The Hague 
18 October 1907.  
30 Commentary AP I, comment no. 2195 
31 Ibid., comment no. 2195. 
32 Ibid., comment no. 2198. 
33 Additional Protocol I, Article 57(2)(a)(ii). 
34 Ibid., Article 57(3).  
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means that the weapon with the most accurate delivery parameters should be 
the one used in the attack where civilians are present or in the vicinity.35 It 
also encompasses the choice between several military objectives, where the 
one which could achieve the same military advantage but that would 
constitute a smaller risk of harming civilians should be chosen. An example 
of this could be to instead of choosing a railway station inside a city, choosing 
a strategic point of the railway junction outside of the urban area – an 
alternative that would generate the same military advantage but cause less 
collateral damage.36  
 
The temporal aspect in choosing military objectives is also important, such as 
planning the attacks at times when the presence of civilians is reduced.37 In 
the choice between means and methods of combat in order to prevent 
collateral damage, the precision and range of the weapons at hand should be 
taken into account.38 According to the ICRC CIHL study, the principle of 
precaution constitutes a rule of CIHL in both international and non-
international conflicts.39 With regards to the requirement to take all feasible 
precaution in the choice of means and methods of warfare, rule 17 of the 
ICRC study states that such precautions include considerations of the timing 
of the attack, avoiding combat in populated areas, the selection of means and 
methods of warfare proportionate to the target, the use of precision weapons 
and target selection.40 The target selection comes back in rule 21 and re-
iterates what Article 57(3) of Additional Protocol I says, that wherever a 
choice is possible, the least damaging one must be selected.  
2.1.4 Martens Clause 
At the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907, the Russian delegate 
Friedrich von Martens introduced the clause that now bears his name, which 
was originally devised to handle a disagreement between the parties at the 
conference regarding the status of resistance movements in occupied territory. 
In the absence of an agreement, the clause was included to remind the parties 
that just because something was not explicitly regulated in the treaty, it did 
not mean that the interpretation of the status of the resistance movements was 
free. Instead, it had to be resolved by reference to the principles of humanity 
and the public conscience.41  
 
In the creation of the APs in 1977, the Martens Clause was included in Article 
1(2)42 and the clause was intended to remind of the binding character of 
                                                 
35 Oeter (2008), p. 210. 
36 Ibid., p. 211.  
37 Commentary AP I, comment no. 2200.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck (2005), p. 51. 
40 Ibid., p. 58. 
41 Greenwood (2008), pp. 33-34. 
42 Article 1(2) reads: 
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, 
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the 
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CIHL, to prevent interpretations e contrario of provisions of IHL that would 
be contrary to the very spirit of IHL itself, and also, to the extent that it is not 
covered by Article 36, to cover the development of new means and methods 
of warfare.43 The exact scope and significance of the clause is still disputed44 
but it can be asserted that it means that the mere omission of a certain matter 
in international law, does not mean that international law necessarily is silent 
on the matter. The exact application of the clause with respect to requiring 
that all means and methods of warfare are to be measured against the standard 
of “the public conscience” is however not clear, as the concept of “the public 
conscience” is too vague to be interpreted in this manner.45 
2.2 Article 36: Regulation of New Weapons 
In the development of the APs, the drafters also saw the need to include a 
provision regulating the creation of new weapons, in order to ensure the future 
effective implementation of the basic rules prohibiting certain means or 
methods of combat, something that resulted in part III of AP I. At first, an 
internationalized control mechanism was envisioned, but due to the secrecy 
surrounding the development of new weapons in each state, it was deemed 
impracticable.46 Instead, the drafters drew inspiration from the several states 
which already had such procedures implemented nationally, and established 
a mandatory system of national control procedure of legality, resulting in 
Article 36 of AP I.47 The Article requires states to, in the study, development, 
acquisition, or adoption of a new weapon, means, or method of warfare, 
determine whether its employment would, in all or some circumstances, be 
prohibited by AP I or any other rule in international law applicable to the 
state.  
 
The commentary to the Article specifies that the determination shall be based 
on the normal use of the weapon as anticipated at the time of the evaluation, 
and that the issue of state responsibility arises if the state fails to respect this 
obligation.48 The commentary also addresses the difficulties in the assessment 
of legality, and the scope of “any other rule of international law applicable to 
the High Contracting Party”. The rules set forth in AP I is quite self-
explanatory, but the concept of “other rules of international law” implies any 
agreement related to disarmament, prohibition, limitation and restriction on 
the use of a certain weapon or a certain type of weapon, concluded by the 
                                                 
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.  
43 Fleck, Dieter “The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts” in The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, Dieter Fleck (ed.), 2008, pp. 619-620. 
44 Which will also affect the applicability of the clause in the matter of autonomous weapons, 
see below chapter 4.3.4. 
45 Greenwood (2008), pp. 34-35. 
46 Commentary AP I, comment no. 1463-1464. 
47 Ibid., comment no. 1467. 
48 Ibid., comment no. 1466. 
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state, and perhaps most importantly, rules that form part of international 
customary law.49 
 
The commentators in 1987 even envisaged the development of long distance 
and remote-controlled weapons, as well as the increased automation of the 
battlefield, as matters that would come to be affected by the provision in 
Article 36 and be object for such an evaluation of legality.50 Also important 
to note is that if a weapon is found to be illegal in one state, it does not 
automatically create a rule of international law vis-à-vis third states, nor is 
there any obligation for the state to make its findings public or to reveal 
anything regarding new weapons during the process of development or 
manufacturing.51 The status of Article 36 as customary law is not entirely 
cemented, and some argue that it is seen as best practice instead of binding 
law.52 The ICRC contends that it is an obligation under Article 36 that several 
non-party states have implemented,53 including the US which is at the 
forefront of research in military robots. However, the exact application and 
interpretation of the scope of Article 36 is not further developed in the Article 
or the rest of the AP, and therefore merits a brief examination. 
2.2.1 When to Review? 
In order to establish a more harmonized practice of Article 36, the ICRC 
issued a guide on the implementation of the Article, intended to provide some 
guidance to member states on vague or unclear matters. To begin with, the 
temporal aspect of the review is, according to the ICRC guide, set to take 
place at the earliest possible stage, i.e. at the conception or design of the 
weapon, and continue throughout the following technological development, 
such as developing prototypes and testing, and should at the very latest be 
done before entering into a production contract.54 The guide also states that 
at each stage of the review, the intended or expected use of the weapon should 
be taken into consideration. One of the reasons for requiring the review to 
take place as early as possible is to avoid huge costs in the, often prolonged, 
development process for a weapon that in the legal review might end up being 
considered as illegal and therefore unusable. This also applies for the 
requirement to continuously review the weapon after it has left the design 
stage, and even the production stage, as the technological characteristics and 
its expected use may change during the continued development phase, i.e. the 
life cycle of the weapon.55  
 
                                                 
49 Ibid., comment no. 1472. 
50 Ibid., comment no. 1476. 
51 Ibid., comment no. 1481. 
52 HRW Report (2012), p. 21. 
53 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck (2005), p. 250. 
54 ICRC A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: 
Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 (hereinafter ICRC Guide), 
Geneva, 2006, p. 23. 
55 Ibid., p. 24. 
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The review should also encompass future alterations and modifications to a 
certain weapon, since a weapon or weapon system may at a first review be 
deemed lawful in accordance with Article 36, but after alterations or 
modifications, may not at all times be considered as such.56 With regards to 
AWs, this means that a lot of autonomous systems that are deployed today 
might require a re-review if they after a while develop the possibility to be 
weaponized, as well as weaponized systems with limited autonomy today, 
that have the possibility to be fully autonomous in the future.57 
2.2.2 What Rules to Consider? 
The second part in the legal review is to determine what rules of international 
law to consider. Article 36 mentions prohibitions “by this Protocol or by any 
other rule of international law”, which includes specific prohibitions in 
international treaty law, such as e.g. the St Petersburg Declaration, the 1907 
Hague Conventions, the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use 
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention and the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-
Personnel Mines. In addition to considerations of treaty law, the legal review 
must also consider relevant rules under customary law as well. The next step 
is to consider the legality of the weapon with regards to its ability to comply 
with the rules and principles set forth in the AP itself, most notably, the 
principles of distinction and proportionality.  
 
Lastly, the review should consider the weapon in light of the principles of 
humanity and dictates of public conscience, also known as the Martens 
Clause.58 This last clause was found to constitute a rule of customary law by 
the ICJ which noted that it “had proved to be an effective means of addressing 
rapid evolution of military technology”.59 
2.3 Accountability 
While accountability is not a necessary requirement for the determination of 
legality of a weapon, it is one of the main issues in the debate on autonomous 
weapons and therefore merits an examination. The issue of accountability is 
crucial in the enforcement of IHL and it arises in relation to questions of 
violations of IHL, i.e. when a provision, rule or norm of IHL has been 
violated, who can be held accountable for that violation? In terms of regular 
combatants it is often an easy matter to resolve – if a soldier did not respect 
the principle of distinction and intentionally or by negligence directed his 
attack against a civilian population, that would constitute a breach of IHL and 
the soldier would consequently be held accountable for that breach. One 
                                                 
56 Ibid., p. 10. 
57 HRW Report (2012), p. 23. 
58 ICRC Guide (2006), pp. 10-14. 
59 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, paras. 78 & 84. 
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further argument is the necessity of accountability to ensure that a war is 
considered a “just” war, under the principle of jus in bello.60  
 
Accountability ensures that persons committing war crimes are brought to 
justice and prevents impunity. Enforcing the laws and rules of IHL is however 
subject to ongoing discussion and the fact that the legal rules are not enforced 
through a central body is still one of the fundamental weaknesses of IHL.61 
In the United Nations (UN) Charter, the means of ensuring compliance lies 
with the Security Council (UNSC) in its responsibility of maintaining 
international peace and security.62 This gives the UNSC the competence to 
take coercive measures against a threat to or breach of the peace. However, it 
is primarily directed against the misconduct of states, and not the misconduct 
of e.g. individual soldiers, which primarily lies under the jurisdiction of 
domestic law. For grave breaches of international law however, the ICC 
Statute has jurisdiction also over individuals.63 The crucial issue of assigning 
accountability to someone, being able to hold someone responsible for 
breaches of international law, is one of the more disputed matters with regards 
to AWs, and will therefore be one of the more important obstacles to 
overcome in the discussion on legality of AWs. 
                                                 
60 Sparrow, Peter “Killer Robots” in Journal of Applied of Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2007, 
p. 67. 
61 Wolfrum, Rüdiger & Dieter Fleck “Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law” in 
The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, Dieter Fleck (ed.), 2008, p. 675. 
62 See e.g. the Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1946, Articles 2(7), 24(1), 50 and 53. 
63 ICC Statute Articles 1, 5 and 8. 
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3 Autonomous Weapons 
3.1 From Mechanical Knights to Remote-
Controlled Flights: History of AWs 
Scientists as early as the 15th century imagined automated machines, e.g. 
Leonardo da Vinci designed a mechanical knight that carried out complex 
movements through a system of strings and pulleys. However, it was not until 
the late 19th century before the more sophisticated automated machines 
started to see the light, where Nikola Tesla built a version of a remote-
controlled electric boat that could also be designed to carry warheads, in other 
words, an early variation of the modern torpedo. In WWI, the German Navy 
built upon the ideas of Tesla and started to experiment with remote-controlled 
torpedoes, and the British Air Force as well demonstrated a prototype of an 
aerial torpedo in 1917. None of these attempts proved any distinct success 
however, and when the war ended, they were shut down.  
 
When WWII hit Europe, the efforts of developing more automated weapons 
recommenced, and Germany, among others, managed to launch the V-1, an 
aerodynamic robot weapon, a flying bomb, that could be used on a massive 
scale and cause considerable damage to the enemy. While the V-1 
successfully attacked the United Kingdom (UK) and caused severe damages 
to the population and buildings, the guidance system of the V-1 was far from 
accurate, and it was only possible to target large areas, and even then, the 
average miss distance was about five miles. Germany also designed a 
prototype of a remote-controlled ground vehicle, called Goliath, which were 
powered by an electric motor and could carry explosives more than one mile. 
In spite of this groundbreaking technology, the Goliath was not considered a 
success either, as it moved very slowly, required the operator to be in line of 
sight (because the machine was not equipped with a camera system), and the 
control cable that connected the machine to the joystick operating it, could 
easily become entangled or even severed by the enemy. As no apparent 
success had been reached with the attempts of automated weapons, 
researchers instead focused on weapons of mass-destruction, and with the 
detonation of the two nuclear bombs in Japan the war ended and the 
development of automated weapons came to an abrupt halt. The military 
research instead entered the nuclear and missile age.64  
 
During the Vietnam War, the US military (primarily) saw the emerge of 
precision munitions and smart weapons that were autonomous in the sense 
that they could find and attack targets once they were launched by a human 
operator, with the targeting often based on radar or other sensor data.65 Apart 
from this development, the nuclear weapon stand-off and the space race were 
predominant during the Cold War era, and progress in the field of automated 
                                                 
64 Krishnan (2009), pp. 14-19.  
65 Ibid., p. 21. 
 21 
weapons was slow, not to say non-existent. In 1983, Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched its Strategic Computing 
Initiative (SCI), aiming to achieve artificial intelligence within a decade, and 
spent over one billion dollars in trying to achieve this as well as developing 
intelligent machines that could wage war all by themselves, virtually 
removing humans from the battlefield altogether. This soon proved to be an 
overly ambitious goal, and while some evolution was seen in the creation of 
e.g. automated defense systems66, the end of the Cold War in the 1990s once 
more halted the ambitions of autonomous weapons. This was partly due to 
cuts in the military budgets, and partly due to public expectations to instead 
focus research and budgets on welfare now that the military threat was finally 
gone. It was partly also because of the slow progress that had been achieved 
in AI and computer perception. The evolution in autonomous weapons and 
military robotics was also not believed to be useful in the featured operations 
of the 1990s: peacekeeping.67  
 
In the early 2000s however, military technology in terms of automation 
finally started to receive attention, and in the wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and 
Iraq in 2003, the US started leading the development with a growing number 
and role, of unmanned systems. At the time, they were primarily intended for 
surveillance and reconnaissance, and secondly intended as a means of 
clearing the way for attacks by manned systems.68 With the development of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the many advantages of unmanned 
systems became clearer and clearer – decreased risk for the own forces 
probably being the biggest benefit as of yet.  
 
Naturally, with all new systems of warfare there are disadvantages as well. 
With unmanned systems, the major factors that push the military towards an 
increasing autonomy in weapon systems are, firstly, the risk of technical 
glitches in remote-controlled systems and secondly, the interest of reducing 
manpower. The risk of electronic malfunction, cyber-attacks and hijacking of 
robots is an issue that arises when the machine is still connected to a human 
operator and relies on the operator for the actual targeting and firing of the 
weapon. Therefore, automating the weapon system and letting the machine 
take care of these matters on its own, eliminates the need for a human operator 
and facilitates the complete severing of the communication link and removes 
the risk of hacking.69 The interest of reducing manpower in the military is due 
both to the decreasing interest and suitability of persons joining the military 
forces, and to cuts in the defense budgets. With remote-controlled systems 
there still needs to be a human operator in the picture, and as current 
unmanned systems require up to three human operators each, plus extra 
persons for support, it is easy to see the call for autonomous systems where 
the number of personnel needed for operating would be dramatically cut, as 
                                                 
66 See below, chapter 3.2.2.1. 
67 Krishnan (2009), pp. 24-25. 
68 Ibid., p. 27. 
69 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
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the system would in effect operate itself.70 With these two major factors as 
traction, the intensified focus on automating weapons is understandable and 
the emergence of the different kinds of AWs a natural consequence.  
3.2 Definition of Autonomous Weapons 
As the field of autonomous weapons is an emerging one, the definitions tend 
to be different depending on the author, and no complete consensus has been 
reached.71 As mentioned in the delimitation chapter, I will not be discussing 
remote-controlled weapon systems in the upcoming subsections, however, a 
basic distinction between these and autonomous systems is necessary for the 
further understanding of AWs. Remote-controlled systems are those that 
require the operation of a human being in the selection of targets, as well as 
activating, directing and firing of the weapons it carries. These are in the 
literature often referred to as UAVs or Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs)72 
– in the public debate, they are most commonly known as “drones”.73 In the 
cases of these systems, the human, while often located elsewhere and many 
times far away, is still “behind the wheel”. These unmanned systems are just 
that – unmanned – no man on board the actual vehicle or device, while 
autonomous systems once activated, have completely severed the tie with the 
human factor.  
 
The word autonomy comes from the Greek words auto (“self”) and nomos 
(“law”), meaning self-rule or self-governing.74 Applying this to the term of 
autonomous weapons, it signifies a weapon that is self-governing, i.e. that 
does not require a human connection with the weapon. Even within this 
category there are different levels of autonomy and similarly, different 
definitions. The three levels of autonomy are, among others, defined in the 
report issued by Human Rights Watch (HRW), Losing Humanity, by the US 
Department of Defense (DoD) in its 2012 Directive on Autonomy in Weapon 
Systems, as well as by Armin Krishnan in his comprehensive book Killer 
                                                 
70 Ibid., pp. 35-36. The numbers of flying hours by the Predator drone increased from 
250 000 in June 2007 to more than a million in 2010. With this increase, the number of 
operators required will of course also surge, and the push towards full autonomy will 
intensify, see Sharkey (2010), p. 371.  
71 Some authors also discusses and differentiate between the concepts of “automated” and 
“autonomous”, however, this is not an issue I will be discussing for the scope of this thesis. 
Cf. Asaro, p. 690, at note 5. 
72 The prevalence in the field (as well as the literature) of UAVs far exceeds that of UGVs, 
due to the higher degree of complexity of the environment in which UGVs operate. Whereas 
UAVs easily navigate in the airspace with the help of GPS, not having to avoid any obstacles, 
UGVs must be able to traverse through a much more complex terrain and identify and 
appropriately respond to obstacles on its way, cf. Krishnan, p. 55.  
73 ICRC Autonomous weapons: States must address major humanitarian, ethical challenges, 
FAQ, 2 September 2013.  
74 Krishnan (2009), p. 43. 
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Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons. The distinction they 
provide are as follows75: 
 
 
In the following examination, the terminology of the definitions put forward 
by Krishnan will be the ones applied.  
3.2.1 Pre-programmed Autonomy 
The first level of autonomy indicates that the machine executes a specific 
function that has been pre-programmed into the system of the machine. 
Generally, weapons with pre-programmed autonomy have no or very limited 
capacity to diverge from the pre-set instructions and subsequently operate 
within very narrow parameters. There are also machines that will be able to 
operate with a structured control which allows for a somewhat greater 
autonomy, which follows a more organized “if-this-then-that”-algorithm.76 
This often consist of a decision process based on sensors that tells the robot 
“obstacle at left – move right”.77 Examples of machines with pre-programmed 
autonomy are robots designed for clearing mines78, robots with tasks such as 
bomb disposal and cave clearance on the ground, as well as robots only used 
for surveillance from the air.79  
3.2.2 Limited or Supervised Autonomy 
With the second level of autonomy, the machine operates almost entirely on 
its own, which means that the variation in its behavior is much greater than 
in the pre-programmed systems, e.g. allowing the machine to find its own 
                                                 
75 HRW Report (2012), p. 2; United States of America Department of Defense Directive 
3000.09 on subject “Autonomy in Weapon Systems”, 21 November 2012, pp. 13-14; 
Krishnan (2009), p. 45. The term “Lethal Autonomous Robots” or LARs, is increasingly used 
in the public debate, but will not be used in this thesis. 
76 Krishnan (2009), pp. 43-44. 
77 Sharkey (2010), p. 377. 
78 Krishnan (2009), p. 33. 
79 Sharkey (2010), p. 370. 
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way without requiring continuous human intervention. These systems would 
require human intervention when it comes to the more complex functions 
such as, first and foremost targeting, but sometimes also triggering of the 
weapon. As they are less capable of dealing with unforeseen situations and 
circumstances, the human operator would therefore also function as 
supervisor for the machine, where the machine at the event of an unforeseen 
situation would report back to the operator who then decides how to proceed. 
This category is probably the most common today and it encompasses a 
variety of different weapon systems that operate within a limited or 
supervised autonomy.80 Today, there are both stationary and increasingly 
mobile machines that are able to e.g. patrol camps, military bases and even 
larger areas, with supervised autonomy.81  
3.2.2.1 Automatic Weapons Defense Systems 
One example of supervised autonomy in machines today are the automatic 
weapons defense systems, i.e. a system devised to sense an incoming threat, 
e.g. a missile or rocket, and then automatically respond in order to neutralize 
the threat. The human supervision is confined to accepting or overriding the 
machine’s plan of action, something that must happen almost instantaneously 
and that is therefore not very common. The earliest version of this defensive 
system was the MK 15 Phalanx, installed on US Navy ships already in 1980. 
It is now being used by both the US and its allies.82 Since then, the US has 
also developed a land-based version, the Counter Rocket, Artillery and 
Mortar System (C-RAM), which was first operated in Iraq in 2005 and 
functions in the same way as the Phalanx. When the C-RAM has detected a 
threat, the human supervisor certifies the target, however this has to happen 
within seconds in order for the system to be able to destroy the incoming 
threat in time.83  
 
It is not only the US that has developed these kind of defense systems, Israel 
has set up its system Iron Dome on the Gaza border which uses a radar to 
detect incoming rockets and responds to those threats automatically. Between 
April 2011 and August 2012 it had a reported success rate of 80%. With this 
defense system as well, the response to a threat is being sent to a human 
operator, who instantaneously has to decide to fire or not, for the machine to 
be effective.84 Additionally, Germany has developed the NBS Mantis, a 
defense system used to protect its operation bases in Afghanistan, which 
detects, tracks and shoots down incoming threats automatically, with human 
                                                 
80 Krishnan (2009), p. 44. 
81 Lubell Speech (2013).  
82 Federation of American Scientists, “MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons Systems (CIWS)”, 
9 January 2003; HRW Report (2012), p. 9. 
83 “Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System Completes Mission in Iraq” in Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) newswire, 16 February 2012; “C-RAM Transform Defense Tactics”, 
US Army news release, 26 April 2012. 
84 Garamone, Jim “Iron Dome System Demonstrates US-Israeli Partnership” in American 
Forces Press Service, 1 August 2012; “Iron Dome Battle Management Demonstrated” in 
Defense Update, 2009.  
 25 
intervention currently being limited to a monitoring role.85 Also the UK is 
currently designing a supersonic aircraft known as the Taranis which is 
capable to fly autonomously but cannot engage targets without the approval 
of a human operator.86 
 
The important difference to note between these and weapons with complete 
autonomy is that these weapons only have a defense function, and have no 
capabilities to take initiatives to attack targets on their own. They will engage 
automatically when they detect a threat, as a defensive mechanism, while a 
completely autonomous weapon would have a more offensive strategy of 
going out and looking for the targets on its own. 
3.2.2.2 Sentry Robots 
Along the lines of limited or supervised autonomy are also the development 
and deployment of sentry robots that operate on the ground. These robots 
have already been deployed in both South Korea and Israel. In 2010 the SGR-
1 sentry robot was installed along the demilitarized zone between South and 
North Korea which detects people in the zone using heat and motion sensors 
and then reports a warning back to a command center. At the command center, 
a human soldier can communicate with the identified person and decide 
whether or not to engage the weapon against the individual. Presently, the 
SGR-1 only have autonomous surveillance capabilities and require a human 
to command the firing of a weapon.87 While at present, it cannot fire without 
a human command, the machine has the possibility for an automatic mode, in 
which it has the capability to perform this firing decision on its own.88  
 
A similar sentry system has been deployed along the Israeli border with Gaza, 
which senses movements and reports those signals back to a distanced facility 
where human soldiers evaluate the data and decides whether or not to fire at 
the object of the movement. The main targets are people trying to cross the 
border and sniper and rocket attacks, and while the sentry for the moment 
requires a human in the loop, the implication is that it will be able to operate 
completely autonomously in the future.89 
3.2.3 Complete Autonomy 
First and foremost, it is important to note that these types of machines only 
exist at an experimental level today, and that they are being built for research 
                                                 
85 “Germany Orders MANTIS C-RAM Base Defense Systems” in Defense Industry Daily, 
17 January 2011.  
86 Schmitt, Michael N., & Jeffrey S. Thurnher “‘Out of the Loop’: Autonomous Weapon 
Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict” in Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 4, 2013, 
p. 239.  
87 Rabiroff, Jon “Machine Gun-Toting Robots Deployed on DMZ” in Stars and Stripes, 12 
July 2010. 
88 Kumagi, Jean “A Robotic Sentry for Korea’s Demilitarized Zone” in Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers Spectrum, 1 March 2007.  
89 “Sentry Tech: Long Distance Stationary Remote Controlled Weapon Station” in Rafael 
Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., p. 1. 
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purposes only. Machines that are capable of complete autonomy are machines 
that can operate completely by themselves without any human intervention 
whatsoever, and to some extent also are capable to learn and adapt their 
behavior based on previous experiences, and in that sense, built upon an 
artificial intelligence designed to resemble human intelligence and thought-
capacity.  
 
Complete autonomy, and accordingly, the complete lack of human 
intervention, means that the operator only programs the machine with the 
objective of the mission, and the machine itself will find a solution to it and 
address the many problems that arise on the mission, on its own. However, 
the technology of today has not yet reached a level of intelligence in these 
machines to make them sufficiently predictable and controllable in order for 
them to be safe and useful for military purposes, although it is the long-term 
goal of DARPA to develop these kind of truly autonomous robots with 
cognitive, self-learning abilities.90 Most authors stress the fact that there are 
currently no fully autonomous weapon systems,91 and some, that there are no 
current intentions of developing such either.92 However, the technology is 
rapidly moving towards full autonomy, and fully autonomous weapon 
systems are expected to be developed already within the next few decades.93 
3.2.3.1 Artificial Intelligence 
For a weapon system to be considered as completely autonomous, there is the 
requirement of AI in the system: the more developed the AI, the smarter the 
AW and therefore, the more tasks will it be able to carry out and subsequently, 
the more useful it will be in military operation. It seems therefore, that the 
research in AI and the development of it is a key aspect to the development 
of AWs, and the success of AWs will depend on it. Additionally, with 
particular importance for this thesis, the development of AI will be a key 
aspect in determining the possible adherence to the rules and principles of 
IHL. Ever since the launch of the SCI by DARPA in 1983, the development 
of AI has been a priority in the pursuit of better military technology.94 While 
                                                 
90 Krishnan (2009), p. 44. 
91 Cf. e.g. Krishnan (2009), p.1; Anderson, Kenneth & Matthew C. Waxman “Law and Ethics 
for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can” 
American University Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2013-11, 2013, p. 3 
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of developing autonomous weapons, Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 The UK Approach to 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, March 2011, paras. 507-508. 
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the success of AI in the field of military technology has been limited, it is 
quite established in computer science and programs based on AI already exist 
online, on platforms such as Narrative Science and Automated Insights. These 
platforms offer programs that processes large amounts of data and produces 
the outcome in neat reports or journal articles, with the purpose of replacing 
humans and therefore allowing companies to cut the costs of staff.95  
 
The same idea applies to the idea of using AI in the military – replacing 
humans in order to cut the costs, but also to minimize or eliminate the risk of 
putting human soldiers in harm’s way, a political factor as important as any. 
While the general field of AI has been around for decades, there is still no 
consensus on the definition of AI, and the field lacks a unifying theory that 
connects the vast variety of sub-disciplines. When AI is discussed in regards 
to research, the division most generally made is between weak and strong AI, 
where the former is designed to solve narrowly defined problems, and the 
latter designed to be able to tackle problems of a greater complexity, a 
machine that could match or even possibly exceed the intelligence of 
humans.96  
 
Speaking in general terms, AI aims to use computers to simulate the human 
brain in order to technically reproduce or mimic human intelligence and 
cognitive abilities. The crucial challenge seems to be the understanding of the 
mechanisms and elements that is the basis of human intelligence, such as the 
ability to understand natural language, to recognize patterns, to apply 
knowledge and to learn. If it became possible to include these abilities in a 
computer program, then the creation of full, strong AI – human-like 
intelligence – would theoretically be possible.  
 
However, the achievement of this has for a long time been a Holy Grail for 
researchers, and even if they are getting closer to systems that are capable of 
mimicking complex human thought processes, the triumph of a strong AI 
might never come.97 In later years, the creation of more and more human-like 
– humanoid – robots have increased98, and while they are mostly used as 
mechanized bartenders, the functions they carry out could possibly be easily 
transferred, from opening bottles and pouring drinks to pulling a trigger on a 
weapon.99 In spite of this prediction, it is questionable to what extent robots 
with AI could actually behave like humans, and Krishnan notes that in the 
development of a strong AI, no matter the amount of troubleshooting and 
redesigning, it seems unlikely that the AI would develop anything that could 
                                                 
95 See websites for Narrative Science, http://narrativescience.com/, and Automated Insights, 
http://automatedinsights.com/, respectively. 
96 Krishnan (2009), p. 47. 
97 Ibid., p. 48. 
98 One recent prototype of these humanoid robot, is the robot called Atlas developed by 
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come close to the ability to instinctively find the best solution to a given 
situation, in a way that a human would.100  
 
Peter Asaro makes the comparison between the argument that today’s AI 
could meet the requirements that international law sets out, and the first kind 
of AI where computer developers predicted that within the decade, a 
computer could beat a Grand Master in chess. It took 40 years before the 
computer Deep Blue in 1997 finally beat the Grand Master Gary Kasparov. 
The important difference here though is that chess is a well-defined game 
based on rules and susceptible to computational analysis – it is not a matter 
of interpretation, and not a matter of social norms. Granted, international law 
is also based on rules, but other than that it should not be compared with a 
game like chess. International law requires interpretation and judgment in 
order for it to make sense and be applicable in real world situations. While 
precedents and established standards aid this interpretation, it is ultimately a 
matter of a case-by-case analysis, where considerations of innumerable 
factors needs to be made, considerations that conceivably only humans are 
capable of.101  
 
Some authors argue on the other hand that recent leaps have been made in the 
research in artificial intelligence, and that this would facilitate taking the 
human out of the loop. It is even contended that the technology essentially 
exists today.102 However, even some of the strong proponents of AWs admits 
that despite impressive advances in the field of AI, it is unlikely to achieve it 
in the near future103, and that artificial intelligence has overpromised 
before.104 This is likely also the reason why proponents generally tend to 
avoid the discussion on the progress of AI today, and stick to the more general 
claim of “strong AI is possible”, in order to not overpromise the possible 
capacity and capability of AI once again. 
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103 Schmitt (2013), p. 20. 
104 Anderson & Waxman (2013), p. 14. 
 29 
4 The Debate on Legality of 
AWs 
To begin with, it is important to note the difference between two kinds of 
legality – legality of a weapon per se, and legality of a weapon with regards 
to the use of that specific weapon. I will examine the legality of autonomous 
weapons in light of both these aspects in turn, however, the first chapter which 
regards legality per se will only be discussed briefly and the different sides of 
proponents and opponents will not be discussed. This is due to the fact that 
the debate does not primarily revolve around the issue of if the weapons are 
illegal per se, but primarily around the issue of legality of the use of the 
weapons. Some discord does exist also around the first question, but not to an 
extent that merits an in-depth examination within the frames of the present 
thesis.  
 
I will however start with an aspect of AWs that is not particularly prominent 
in the debate, but that nonetheless deserves some reflection, the moral and 
ethical aspect of using AWs.105 In my view, the absence of this aspect from 
the growing debate on AWs is a bit disconcerting, because it seems as if 
advocates miss out on a fundamental discussion, before the legality should 
even be discussed. Indeed, the moral and ethical aspects can be seen as 
overarching principles that should be considered before the legality and 
compliance or non-compliance of the material rules of IHL is even discussed, 
but the moral and ethical aspects could also be a part of the legality 
assessment in itself.106 
4.1 Morality and Ethicality of AWs 
When parties discuss the legality of AWs, the arguments and the discussion 
is often limited to a discussion on the ability or inability for AWs to comply 
with the rules that IHL (primarily) sets out. Some authors touch upon the very 
important, but sometimes overlooked, issue of morality and ethics in relation 
to the deployment of AWs in battle, but the discussion on these moral and 
ethical issues often falls short of a proper review, and often leaves the 
impression that the author himself does not believe the argument is valid. In 
the debate, the issues presented below are discussed and considered as purely 
moral issues, but I would like to question this separation and wonder if the 
moral issues could be considered within the scope of legality as well. There 
are certain matters that may seem moral but that could have implications for 
the legality assessment, and in relation to the legality of AWs, I think that it 
                                                 
105 While concepts of morality and ethicality are broad and could entail a number of different 
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 30 
is vital to consider the discussion on the fundamental idea that wars are fought 
by humans, and that it should be allowed more space in the current debate.  
 
In all past and present regulations on how wars are to be fought, the agents of 
wars have always been humans. It has been taken for granted as a silent 
precondition, and not even considered worth mentioning in treaty texts etc., 
but the introduction of autonomous weapons in the arena of war begs this 
essential reconsideration – what happens to international humanitarian law if 
we change the agents of war? When the robot not only is capable of 
performing an order (to kill a combatant) but also is capable of making that 
decision on its own, perhaps the robot has been elevated morally from being 
a mere object to being a subject capable of morally meaningful actions (the 
decision to kill or not to kill)?107 Are AWs still to be viewed as only a tool for 
soldiers to use, or is it elevated to being a soldier itself? The definition of a 
combatant as an operator of a weapon or weapon system, allows the potential 
interpretation of AWs as being combatants, at least in theoretical terms. Not 
only could this shift mean great difficulties in pure terminology of the laws 
and regulations, but in a moral and ethical sense as well.108  
 
While IHL may be competent to change and adapt in order to encompass 
further developments in the means and methods of war, the current 
development where the agents of war may be changing and no longer be 
humans, is something that probably was not envisioned and therefore 
something that IHL does not consider. Therefore, if we enter into this 
discussion on new agents, in effect we leave the realm of IHL. Some argue 
that the discussion on personhood and status of robots could be compared to 
the legal status of children, and that robots therefore would be to consider as 
quasi-agents, with only a limited amount of responsibilities and duties.109 This 
perspective might provide an explanation to the question of status, but it does 
not answer the problem of accountability, and more importantly, it does not 
at all resolve the moral and ethical issues tied to the matter of agents in war. 
 
These issues of morality in relation to AWs are gradually starting to attract 
attention from scientists and authors on the subject, and concerns are starting 
to be raised: if our morality is what makes us humans, such as being able to 
have a gut instinct or a “sixth sense” that allows us to make decisions in war 
based on this, would robots who lack these qualities in essence be immoral?110 
And if we cannot know exactly what it is that makes us humans, that allows 
us to interpret complex situations and contexts111, how are we to transfer this 
onto a machine? And perhaps more importantly, do we want to transfer this 
onto a machine? Would it be fundamentally immoral to delegate life-and-
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death decisions onto a machine that does not possess the moral instincts 
necessary to make a considered and informed decision about taking a human 
life?112 Without human reason, judgment and compassion?113 The “three laws 
of robotics” as set out by Isaac Asimov might seem appealing in theory, 
especially given its background in popular culture, but in practice, the 
application of a “robot morality” will prove more complicated than that.114  
 
Some proponents offer solutions where morality and ethicality is 
programmed into the robots through complex algorithms or learning-based 
programs, such as Ronald Arkin who proposes a complex algorithm that 
could be developed and function as an “ethical governor” in AWs115. Others 
seem to already have taken a stand on the matter, and propose that it does not 
necessarily have to be human beings that are the agents of war, that machines 
are able to perform at least equally efficient as humans, and thus, that the 
moral imperative for using machines is already there.116 This approach 
resembles the concept of “reduction to purpose” as explained by Martti 
Koskenniemi117, where proponents often skip the discussion on morality of 
AWs, reducing the discussion to the purpose of saving as many (innocent) 
lives as possible.118 If this purpose can be reached through the use of AWs, 
why take the often long and bothersome detour of discussing the moral 
aspects of letting AWs become the new agents of war? This shortcut could 
possibly lead to policymakers and military strategists to assume that 
technological advancement is the same as moral advancement.119 Arkin also 
argues that the full moral capabilities of humans does not need to be 
reproduced in robots in order to attain an acceptable standard of moral in these 
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robots.120 In addition, if we were to shift the moral responsibility onto the 
machine itself, we might be overlooking the discussion on what ethical 
judgment actually entails. Kaag and Kaufman argue on their side that warfare 
must be regarded as a strictly human activity and that we could never transfer 
moral responsibility onto a machine.121 
 
As Peter Asaro puts it, the two most important questions in the consideration 
of moral and ethical aspects of AWs, are if a machine could make life-and-
death decisions like this, and, perhaps the most important, if a machine ought 
to make these decisions at all. He begs the question that if we eliminate the 
human from the decision-making process, how do we ensure that the killing 
is not arbitrary? Overall, Asaro means that it would be morally and ethically 
wrong to relinquish these kinds of decisions to a machine, which is by no 
means developed or advanced enough to mimic a human and the human 
intellect, and that there is no automated process that should be accepted as a 
replacement for humans. Even if the technology could be made advanced 
enough to be able to satisfactorily perform the requirements for distinction 
and proportionality, and indeed perhaps be able to make fewer errors in a 
discrimination task, the decision of taking a human life should in any way not 
be transferred onto a machine.122 Kaag and Kaufman points out that ethical 
judgments cannot be made by determinate rules and that it requires the 
flexibility and sensitivity that only humans possess.123 Ethical decision-
making is a human endeavor and occurs in unique and ever-changing 
circumstances, and the meaning of right and wrong in these circumstances 
cannot be determined by some sort of general metric that applies to all 
conceivable cases, but through a manner of unique interpretation on a case-
by-case basis.124 The ability to respond flexibly and contextually to 
ambiguous situations that present themselves in the battlefield is a reflection 
of the human capacity of such complex moral judgment.125 
 
Krishnan points out the incapability of a machine to understand the finality 
of life, and that “[w]here there is no ability to die there is no true capability 
for ethical behavior.” Therefore, AWs are not capable of ethical behavior, and 
not capable of making decisions that affects the life and death of humans.126 
Today, it seems that there is no reason to believe that, even with the emerging 
technology with the possible capacity to improve human life, technology 
would be able to solve ethical problems that have challenged humans for 
thousands of years.127 Asaro asserts that the problem does not lie with the 
technology in itself, but on the contrary, that if the technology existed and 
was advanced enough, that technology ought to be used in order to assist the 
human soldiers to fulfill the requirements of distinction and proportionality, 
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but not to allow AWs to use that technology all on their own.128 Also Krishnan 
makes this comment that technology might become superior to the 
performance of human soldiers, but that the crucial issue is that that specific 
technology is being used in the best and correct way, keeping in mind the 
ultimate goal of IHL – to protect those who are not, or no longer, taking a 
direct part in hostilities.129   
 
When it comes to the intricate discussion on morality and ethicality in regards 
to warfare and AWs in particular, Anderson and Waxman hits the nail on the 
head in stating that “this is a difficult argument to address, since it stops with 
a moral principle that one either accepts or does not accept”.130  
 
Ultimately, the issues of morality in relation to AWs seem to remain in the 
shadow of the current debate, and while the question of the status of AWs as 
tools of combatants, or as combatants in themselves, could have grave 
consequences for matters such as accountability131, it seems as the debate will 
continue to revolve around the technological capability to adhere to the laws 
and regulations.  
4.2 Legality Per Se 
The idea of some weapons being inherently inhumane, no matter the use of 
the weapon, has been recognized in treaty law since 1907132 and is now part 
of customary law.133 The legality of a weapon per se addresses weapons that 
by their very nature are unlawful, no matter what targets they are aimed at or 
no matter how it is being used. Legality of a weapon per se is governed 
primarily through two Articles of AP I: Article 51(4), indiscriminate weapons 
and Article 35(2), weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous 
injury.  
4.2.1 Indiscriminate Weapons 
Article 51(4) states that a weapon is considered illegal per se if it by its very 
nature is indiscriminate and cannot be aimed at a specific target and therefore 
is likely to cause harm to civilians as well as combatants in its use. The Article 
states that, among others, attacks which are indiscriminate are those that 
employ a means or method of combat that cannot be directed against a 
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specific military objective, and attacks which may be expected to cause 
collateral damage that is excessive in relation to the military advantage 
anticipated.134 This means that the assessment of distinction and 
proportionality already forms part of the determination of if a weapon is 
indiscriminate, as well as the determination of the lawful use of a weapon.135  
 
Indiscriminate weapons that have been prohibited through international 
conventions over the years include anti-personnel mines (a mine that is 
designed to explode by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that 
will injure or kill one or more persons)136, and cluster munitions (a 
conventional munition designed to disperse or release explosive sub-
munitions that each weigh less than 20 kilos).137 Both anti-personnel mines 
and cluster munitions have been prohibited because they constitute weapons 
that by their very nature are incapable of distinguishing between civilians and 
combatants. Both weapons also often leave behind large amounts of 
unexploded ordnance which kills and injures both civilians and combatants 
for years and decades after its use. They therefore constitute indiscriminate 
weapons.  
 
In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ discussed the opinion 
expressed by some states, that nuclear weapons would be unlawful in itself 
because it could never comply with the principles of IHL, including the 
prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, since “such weapons should kill and 
destroy in a necessarily indiscriminate manner, on account of the blast, heat 
and radiation occasioned by the nuclear explosion”.138 After establishing that 
“the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable” with the 
requirements of IHL, the Court did however state that it could not conclude 
with certainty that nuclear weapons were unlawful in all circumstances.139 
Even though the Court in this case did not conclude on the illegality of nuclear 
weapons, it did establish that the prohibition of indiscriminate weapons, along 
with the principles of distinction and proportionality, is of cardinal 
importance in IHL.140 The idea the Court had, was that nuclear weapons could 
be lawfully used in the extreme circumstance of self-defense where the 
survival of the state was at stake.141 Here, it is not difficult to draw an analogy 
between nuclear weapons and autonomous weapons, and, in fact, an armed 
robot would probably seem even less dangerous and cause less widespread 
injury than a nuclear weapon. Thus, with this analogy, allowing for the use of 
AWs in, at least, extreme circumstances.142  
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4.2.2 Unnecessary Suffering or Superfluous 
Injury 
The second part of the inherent illegality is based on Article 35(2) which 
prohibits the use of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare 
which are of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. 
This prohibition forms part of Article 35 which deals with basic rules of 
warfare, and which implies the fundamental principle of that the only 
legitimate object of acts of war, is to weaken the military forces of the enemy, 
or to disarm them, and that it is therefore prohibited to use means or methods 
of warfare which are excessive after having rendered the enemy hors de 
combat.143 The prohibition of anti-personnel mines as mentioned above, was 
in part also based on this principle, as the explosion of such mines often cause 
severe injuries and disabilities on the victims.  
 
Other weapons that have been considered to cause unnecessary suffering or 
superfluous injury include expanding bullets (“dum-dum-bullets”), exploding 
bullets, poisonous and asphyxiating gases, biological and chemical weapons, 
weapons that leave fragments not detectable by X-ray, incendiary weapons 
and blinding laser weapons. As there is no complete consensus on what kind 
of weapons constitute unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, there is 
subsequently no absolute consensus on the unlawfulness of all of the above 
mentioned weapons, however, there is a general agreement that most of them 
are prohibited.144 In the pursuit of developing more tenable criteria for this 
prohibition, the ICRC has launched the SIrUS-project which proposes the 
following criteria that would ban weapons if their use cause: 
- A specific disease, specific abnormal physiological state, a specific 
and permanent disability or specific disfigurement; or 
- Field mortality of more than 25% or a hospital mortality of more than 
5%; or 
- Grade 3 wounds as measured by the Red Cross wound classification 
scale; or 
- Effects for which there is no well-recognized and proven treatment145 
Given these criterion set forward, it seems implausible that AWs, by their very 
nature, would cause these kinds of suffering or injury and therefore be 
prohibited as such under this principle. 
4.3 Legality of the Use of AWs 
While no explicit consensus on the legality per se exists, the core 
disagreement seems to lie instead in the discussion on the lawfulness of the 
use of AWs which will be discussed in the present chapter. Starting from the 
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description of current fundamental principles of IHL as set out in chapter two, 
I will in this chapter examine the arguments set forth by the proponents and 
the opponents for AWs. I will discuss the principles in the same order as in 
chapter two, and finish each with some concluding remarks.  
4.3.1 Distinction 
4.3.1.1 Sufficient Sensors and Software: Arguments in 
Favor of AWs 
As noted above, the principle of distinction is applicable in all armed 
conflicts, both international and non-international, and provides a protection 
for civilians in times of armed conflicts, unless and for such time as they 
directly participate in hostilities. The issue at hand is whether or not an AW 
would be able to adhere to this principle and fulfil it in a satisfactory way, if 
a machine would be able to distinguish between a civilian and a combatant, 
and especially between civilians who does or does not take a direct part in the 
hostilities.  
 
Proponents for the use of AWs argue that algorithms that attribute values to 
sensor data are theoretically achievable, which then would make it possible 
for them to distinguish between civilians and combatants in the battlefield, as 
well as between civilian and military objectives and accordingly only direct 
its attacks on the latter.146 These sensors would be equipped in a way that 
allowed the AW to e.g. recognize if the potential target is a child, is carrying 
a weapon or otherwise engaging in hostilities.147 Another proposal consist of 
programming distinction into the AWs software through categories and 
samples of lawful targets (e.g. persons or weapons that fire at the AW), and 
incrementally develop this into inductive reasoning about certain 
characteristics of lawful targets that might not be on the list.148 This method, 
as well as the method using sensors and recognition processes to identify 
combatants might be based on case-reasoning and simulations to improve the 
inductive learning process of the machine.149 If these sensors and/or the 
programmed sample-technique would be developed enough, it could prove to 
be a good enough tool to distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets, and 
thus be considered to comply with the principle of distinction.  
 
Some authors note that the surrounding context and environment is of crucial 
importance when determining the AWs capability to adhere to the principle 
of distinction, and that in the contemporary battlefield which is getting 
increasingly cluttered and less clear-cut, the requirement for distinction is 
much higher, and the challenge therefore much greater. In these new settings 
and often urban areas, the development of a finely calibrated sensor package 
and advanced recognition software is vital in order to comply with the 
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principle of distinction. Some also admit that even if such technology actually 
is set in place, there could be situations that would be so complex that AWs 
would simply be unable to meet the requirement, and the use of which 
therefore would be unlawful – the result being that the AW may only be used 
in situations and under circumstances where it would be able to distinguish 
satisfactorily.150  
4.3.1.2 Civilians in Contemporary Conflicts: 
Arguments Against AWs 
Opponents to AWs on the other hand, mean that AWs could never comply 
with the principle of distinction, particularly that they would not have the 
ability to sense or interpret the difference between civilians and combatants – 
especially in the context of contemporary armed conflicts, where everyone 
can be a civilian or a combatant, and where combatants often disguise 
themselves as civilians. Many authors point out the fact that the wars are 
changing, and that the conventional warfare has started to fade out and 
untraditional warfare emerge more and more, which makes it increasingly 
difficult, even for human soldiers, to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate targets, in accordance with the principle of distinction.  
 
It is more and more often the situation where combatants hides in cities or 
urban areas along with the civilian population, not to mention the fact that in 
these new conflicts, combatants rarely wear uniforms or other military 
insignia, thus making the only characteristic that allows them to be identified 
as combatants, their conduct, their “direct participation in hostilities”.151 In 
contemporary, urban battlefields with an increased chaos of combat, the task 
of distinguishing between civilians and combatants could prove to be beyond 
the capability of a machine, and even if the perception sensors were developed 
enough, it would be easy to trick the robots by concealing weapons or by 
exploiting the limitations the AW is bound by.152  
 
Schmitt & Thurnher points out in their article that “not all battle spaces 
contain civilians or civilian objects”, and this could be true for e.g. battles at 
sea. However, almost all land based as well as airborne battlefields will affect 
civilians to some extent, and thus the argument that AWs could be used in 
certain environments becomes virtually redundant, as these weapons would 
not be employable in the overwhelming part of contemporary battle spaces, 
and therefore have no practical use.153 Noel Sharkey, one of the more vocal 
of the opponents to AWs, points out that if it was as simple as instructing a 
computer of “if a civilian, do not shoot”, then the principle of distinction 
might be able to be fulfilled. However, there is no way to actually give the 
computer the information or a definition of what a civilian actually is, as IHL 
does not provide a sufficient enough definition that could be programmed into 
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a machine, but only a definition that requires the use of common sense and 
deductive reasoning.154 Kaag and Kaufman also stress the continuum of cases 
varying by the level of involvement or support provided in an attack, where 
the spectrum varies from a soldier firing his weapon on one end, to a civilian 
who does not play any role in the attack, on the other end. The determination 
of a legitimate target is therefore a matter of degree of involvement, and the 
creation of a set of rules that in advance prescribes the situations where lethal 
force is permissible is therefore unlikely.155 
 
Some also point to the limited understanding an AW would have of human 
intention, an assessment that is a key aspect of distinguishing lawful targets 
from unlawful. Human Rights Watch poses the scenario of a mother running 
after her two children who is playing with toy guns near a soldier. Whereas a 
human soldier would identify the intention of the mother and the children as 
harmless, an AW might not perceive these intentions and instead see a person 
running toward it and two individuals with guns, which in the eyes of the AW 
would constitute lawful targets.156 The same reasoning applies to persons, 
often children, which are forced to bear arms or carry weapons against their 
will. Without the subjective assessment made by a human soldier that can 
perceive things that a machine cannot, such as body language that would 
indicate this involuntary action, the machine would again consider these 
children as lawful targets and pull the trigger.157  
 
Furthermore, to determine what “direct participation in hostilities” entails, the 
ICRC has established a set of guidelines which sets forth three requirements 
that when satisfied, conclude that a civilian is a legitimate target; firstly a 
threshold of harm, secondly a direct causation and finally a belligerent 
nexus.158 This attempt of adopting guidelines is one means of determining 
who is a legitimate target and who is not, but it is in no way an exhaustive 
guide, as each of these assessments also requires a sophisticated 
understanding of the complex situation of each individual that might or might 
not be participating in the hostilities. Additionally, the guidelines, as with all 
other rules of IHL, require an immensely interpretative judgment in order to 
be correctly and appropriately applied in any given situation, something the 
AW could not fulfill.159  
 
To argue in favor of a solution based on a fixed list of lawful targets may be 
technically correct, but is unrealistic with regards to the contemporary 
battlefields of today, and such a limitation to the use of AWs would mean that 
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they would be unfit in virtually all circumstances – an approach that hardly is 
realistic or desirable.160  
4.3.1.3 Concluding Remarks 
Clearly, the debate on whether or not autonomous weapons are or will be able 
to comply with this fundamental principle is heated, and each side of the 
discussion strongly advocates for their side. It seems as the discussion on 
distinction, and the capability of AWs to comply with this requirement, 
revolves around the issue of how the AW would be equipped (sensors, 
camera, pre-programmed list of targets etc.) and if it could ever be equipped 
in a way that satisfactorily and lawfully fulfills the requirements set out by 
the principle. Another core issue here as well is that if we were to employ 
autonomous weapons in the battlefield, the minimum standard should be that 
they were as good as or better than a human being. Again, if this distinction 
is hard enough for a human soldier to make, how is a machine going to make 
it as well or better? The proposition of combining the AWs with facial 
recognition software, is interesting, but the obvious limitation of the weapon 
only being applicable to certain, recognizable individuals, if – at all – it was 
able to actually identify an individual’s face in real time moving 
circumstances.161  
 
Even if AWs could be equipped with appropriate and sufficient sensors and 
recognition software, the problem of the contextual definition of civilians and 
combatants still remains, perhaps even more so in the more and more complex 
battlefields, where today the most distinguishing feature that separates 
combatants from civilians is not some form of easily defined outer 
characteristic, such as uniforms or insignias, but the vague concept of “direct 
participation in hostilities”. While work has been done from the ICRC to 
create an interpretive guide on the notion of this direct participation,162 the 
conclusions set out in this publication are not easily, if at all, transformed into 
algorithms and software codes, that could be programmed into an AW and as 
such, applied in combat in a way that would allow the AW to respect the 
principle of distinction.  
 
As mentioned earlier, in the lines of the ideas of Asaro and Krishnan, one 
solution to the problems that would arise by letting AWs perform assessments 
on distinction, could be to instead use the machines in order to aid human 
soldiers to perform their assessment better and more accurately, and not 
allowing the machines to perform these assessments by themselves. 
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4.3.2 Proportionality 
4.3.2.1 Pre-programmed Probabilities: Arguments in 
Favor of AWs 
In order for AWs to fully comply with the requirement of proportionality that 
IHL sets out, the machines would have to be able to estimate the expected 
amount of collateral damage in an attack, as well as the military advantage 
expected from that attack – and finally, weigh these two estimates together in 
order to determine if the collateral damage would be excessive and the attack 
therefore unlawful. In calculating the estimates of collateral damage, most 
militaries today have developed the procedure known as CDEM – Collateral 
Damage Estimation Methodology, which relies on objective and scientific 
criteria for its assessment.163 According to this methodology, the attacking 
force considers factors such as the precision of a weapon, its blast effect, 
attack tactics and the probability of civilian presence in the proximity of the 
target.164 As this methodology is already based on calculable algorithms, an 
AW would not have any problems in performing these calculations.  
 
While the estimation of the anticipated military advantage is contextual, and 
often made on a case-by-case basis, some argue that it is conceivable to create 
a framework of pre-programmed values where the military operator pre-
determines what constitutes excessive collateral damage in relation to a 
certain target. To comply with the principle of proportionality, these pre-
determined values would have to be set at an utmost conservative level. Also 
geographical (depending e.g. on the surroundings and placement of the 
battlefield) or temporal (depending both e.g. the time of the day, i.e. when 
many civilians are out and about, and the time in the conflict, i.e. early on or 
late in the conflict) limits could be established to help the AW comport with 
the requirements of proportionality.165 Attaching values to various targets, 
objects and categories of humans could also include an inductive element, 
where the machine learns from human examples and human judgment about 
proportionality, and carries out the probabilistic assessment based on this.166 
These, not yet developed but possible, algorithms that could estimate the 
military advantage, could be combined with thresholds for unacceptable 
collateral damage, and these thresholds would then mean that the AW is 
programmed not to fire upon a target if the estimation calculates an amount 
of collateral damage above the threshold.167  
 
It could also be argued that AWs might be even better than humans to 
determine the proper amount of force to be deployed, as an AW could more 
quickly and precisely calculate blast effects and other weapon effects which 
would cause collateral damage. An AW could possibly perform hundreds of 
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calculations at a time, which then would increase the lethality of the attack, 
while at the same time reduce the probability of civilian casualties, 
calculations that are far too complex for a human to perform equally well.168  
 
In addition, the arming of the robot is an essential part of the proportionality 
assessment, and if the AW was to be armed with highly precise 
microprojectiles instead of larger missiles, the eventual damage caused by 
e.g. the projectile missing its target, would be relatively small. Furthermore, 
lacking a need or inherent reaction of self-defense, a robot would not risk 
responding with aggression and an excessive amount of force, something a 
human soldier would risk in a similar situation.169  
4.3.2.2 Complex Contextual Calculations: Arguments 
Against AWs 
Those opposing AWs, claim on the other hand that the principle of 
proportionality requires an assessment and a judgment inherent in humans, 
that a fully autonomous weapon could never replicate or improve. As even 
proponents like Michael Schmitt notes, the principle, while easily stated, is 
one of the most difficult ones in IHL to apply, particularly due to the 
difficulties in valuation.170 Opponents primarily stress the fact that the 
weighing of the circumstances before taking a decision is ultimately a 
subjective matter. As with the arguments regarding distinction, they argue 
that the technology of determining which weapon might cause the least 
amount of collateral damage, instead should be used to assist commanders 
and human soldiers to do their estimations and assessment better – not for the 
machine to do this by itself.  
 
The calculation of whether the minimum number of civilian casualties and 
damage to civilian property is proportional to the anticipated military 
advantage to be gained from that specific attack, and a decision based on this 
calculation, should be performed by humans.171 If software and algorithms 
could be developed that makes it possible for a robot to calculate the estimated 
civilian harm – an imaginable version of the CDEM as mentioned above – all 
the robot would have to do is count the number of civilians present in the 
intended target area, decide which weapon to use and then calculate the blast 
radius of that weapon of both lethal and injurious effects. But once the robot 
has made this calculation, how is it to balance this against the military 
advantage, taking for granted that it is even capable of calculating what the 
military advantage is (which is far from certain) and come to a decision that 
respects the principle of proportionality? This balancing act is an inherently 
subjective test, something that human soldiers often have enough difficulties 
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in considering, and that test could never be interpreted into calculations in a 
computer.172  
 
While the criteria remain unclear as regards how to perform this balancing 
act, even for humans, there can be no alternative. This balancing process is so 
complicated and requires a vast amount of data and different factors to be 
taken into account, that an attempt to replicate this capability in a machine, 
designing a formula that would be both comprehensive and precise, simply 
seems futile. In the assessment of proportionality, common sense is 
irreplaceable and inimitable.173  
 
To determine the proportionality of an attack or military operation depends to 
the largest part on context, and even if it might be possible to program an AW 
with pre-determined values, opponents mean that it is highly unlikely that it 
could be programmed to deal with the infinite number of scenarios it might 
face in the battlefield, and also to take into account every movement and to 
adapt to an ever-changing proportionality evaluation.174 This means that AWs 
essentially could become unpredictable, with the increasing complexity of the 
software coding, consisting of millions of lines of codes combined from the 
work of several programmers. With the codes becoming more and more 
intricate and consist of such large amounts of information, there is the risk 
that no single individual is able to completely predict the effect of a given 
command, since portions of these large programs can come to interact in ways 
that are unexpected and untested.175  
4.3.2.3 Concluding Remarks 
With regards to the principle of proportionality, it is clear that the two-part 
balancing act that makes up the principle, is exceedingly hard to accomplish. 
The first part of the assessment, calculating the estimated collateral damage, 
could possibly be computerized, along the lines of the existing program 
CDEM. The second part proves much more of a challenge though, and there 
is strong disagreement on the possibility of a machine to actually calculate 
the anticipated military advantage satisfactorily, and as this is often based on 
a case-by-case analysis, the programming of this could prove too difficult for 
a computer to carry out. In addition, the principle also requires the weighing 
of these two assessments against each other, and an evaluation of whether the 
result of this weighing would be proportional or not.  
 
In the steadily more complicated and complex algorithms required to perform 
these assessments, there is also the risk of the machine becoming too 
unpredictable in their behavior, a source of major concern, especially 
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considering that these robots may be employed in unstructured 
environments.176 In the debate over AWs compliance with the principle of 
proportionality, the most pressing concern is whether or not a robot could be 
designed to calculated military advantage, a calculation that essentially is a 
matter of subjectivity that would be exceedingly hard for a robot to replicate. 
Ultimately, this would be dependent on what happens in the development of 
strong AI.177 
4.3.3 Precaution 
4.3.3.1 Capacity of Care and Caution: Arguments in 
Favor of AWs 
The requirement of doing everything feasible to verify that a target is in fact 
a military objective, as set out in the principle of precaution, poses high 
demands on an AW, demands that nonetheless could be met, provided that 
the AW is equipped with sufficient on-board or external sensors that ensures 
the reliability of target identification, e.g. the ability to zoom in and narrow 
down the location of enemy forces, and efficient recognition of targets.178 It 
is also asserted that in many cases, the recognition capabilities of the machine 
would be sufficiently advanced to meet this requirement of identifying a 
military objective in a reliable manner.179 In addition, it is conceivable that in 
keeping with the requirement of identifying the objective with care, an AW 
with advanced telescopic sight and cameras with zooming capabilities, would 
be better equipped at doing this for objectives located at a great distance than 
a human soldier. One soldier expressed that with the advanced camera 
system, it is possible to read people’s nametags at 300 meters, that same 
persons facial expressions, what weapon he is carrying and even if its selector 
is on fire or on safe.180 Provided this technology develops, AWs will be able 
to comply with this part of the principle of precaution.  
 
The second part of the principle proves more difficult, as this requires 
selecting the means of warfare likely to cause least collateral damage, without 
sacrificing the military advantage. As with the principle of distinction and 
proportionality, some proponents argue that the AWs would be superior to 
human soldiers in carrying out the necessary assessments with regards to 
precautions and avoiding collateral damage, because its sensor systems might 
be more precise or discriminatory than that of a human soldier, or because its 
ability to take decisions under certain circumstances, e.g. particularly 
dangerous ones, could exceed that of a human soldier.181 One additional 
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possibility to ensure that AWs comply with the principle of precaution could 
be that of arming them with non-lethal weapons, or requiring them to use non-
lethal force as a first resort. One example of this is the PackBot developed by 
robotics company iRobot, which has the capability to be equipped with 
shotguns that can fire non-lethal rubber bullets.182  
 
The alternative to only use non-lethal force as a first resort could also be a 
solution in order to take the necessary precautions, as this would allow the 
AW to initially attempt to only disarm the enemy, then take appropriate action 
depending on the response from the enemy, e.g. if the AW initially recognizes 
a child carrying a gun as a target, it could fire rubber bullets to disarm the 
child, instead of firing lethal bullets which would not be an appropriate 
response to the threat that child poses.183 If the machine was programmed to 
use non-lethal force only, this would eliminate the risk of the AW not 
complying with the principles of IHL.184 The option of using non-lethal force 
as a first resort is not really a plausible solution for humans, as they could be 
risking their lives if they chose to use non-lethal force in a similar situation – 
a risk that AWs could take, but not humans. 
4.3.3.2 Meagre Measures by Machines: Arguments 
Against AWs 
Again, as with the two previous principles, it is conceivable that if the 
technology becomes advanced enough, that technology could be used by 
human soldiers to better comply with the requirements set out by these 
principles – i.e. allowing human soldiers to benefit from e.g. the advanced 
camera system mounted on a remote-controlled machine in order to make 
better informed decisions with regards to precaution, but not allowing the 
machine to make these decisions on its own.185  
 
The argument that AWs may be able to use non-lethal force is not 
unproblematic either, as even non-lethal weapons mounted on an autonomous 
weapon system (AWS) can cause indiscriminate injuries and even deaths, 
when using weapons such as rubber bullets, Tasers and new directed-energy 
weapons (weapons directing microwaves, lasers, sound etc.).186 Ultimately, 
an AW is by definition a machine and no matter how technologically 
advanced it might become and how perfectly it may mimic us humans, it 
could never be truly like humans. In that sense, opponents doubt how we 
could trust that a machine will be able to take measures in order to take 
constant care of the civilian population, and to protect it, if it has no real 
relation to the civilian population, no actual awareness about the population, 
or anything else outside itself and its calculating programs for that matter.187 
The moral and ethical constrain, a result of the human capability of 
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empathizing with other humans, that may hinder a human soldier from an 
attack or taking an extra measure to ensure that precaution is taken, will not 
be able to be made by a machine. The commentary to Article 57 also 
emphasizes that the interpretation above all must be a question of common 
sense and good faith for military commanders, and that the weighing of 
humanitarian and military interests at stake must be carefully done in each 
and every attack. This begs the question if a machine could ever replicate the 
common sense and good faith required.188 A human would in all 
circumstances have a superior comprehension on situations that arise and if 
that new situation justifies the use of lethal force. It would not simply pull the 
trigger blindly because a programmed algorithm said so.189 
4.3.3.3 Concluding Remarks 
The question of whether or not AWs will be able to fulfill the requirements 
that the principle of precaution sets out, is probably the strongest point for the 
proponents, and conversely the weakest for the opponents. This can even be 
inferred already from the fact that not all190 opponents actually discuss the 
principle of precaution. The principle can, in its practical application, be 
boiled down to the two requirements of target selection and weapon selection. 
Both of these requirements are important when it comes to AWs but apply at 
different stages.  
 
Weapon selection applies first of all to the commanders deciding at the 
beginning of an operation to select a weapon – a manned weapon or an 
autonomous weapon depending on which weapon would cause the least 
damage and suffering. It also applies to the autonomous weapon system when 
launched – in the situation where the AWS identifies a target, it is required of 
the robot to choose the weapon or way of using its weapon in the way that 
causes the least damage and suffering.  
 
Target selection applies to the AW in the same sense, when it is deployed in 
the battlefield, the robot is required to choose its targets in accordance with 
the principle of precaution (as well as distinction and proportionality), and to 
refrain from engaging the weapon if it, in its assessment of the target, 
discovers that it would not fulfill the demands of precaution. This is where 
questions and disagreements still exists regarding the capability of an AW to 
be sufficiently aware of its surroundings to fulfill these requirements of 
weapon and target selection.  
 
With regards to taking all feasible precautions to cause the least possible 
harm, the emerging thought of allowing AWs if the lethal decision-making is 
always done by a human has been proposed,191 meaning that non-lethal 
weapons should be the principal rule but that AWs could be equipped with 
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lethal weapons if it was programmed in a way that required a human 
authorization for the use of the lethal force.192 
 
Unfortunately, in the debate on precaution (precaution in particular, but to 
some extent also with regards to the principles of distinction and 
proportionality) it often seems as though the propositions put forward by the 
proponents, rather are efforts to appease the opponents than sincere 
propositions, as these propositions often would mean that the AWs would be 
unusable in practice (e.g. the suggestions that AWs would only operate in 
battlefields where no civilians are present, thus complying with the principle 
of distinction, or that the AWs could use non-lethal force in order to comply 
with the principle of precaution). 
4.3.4 Martens Clause 
The issue at hand here is whether or not the Martens Clause should be taken 
into account during the assessment of legality of the autonomous weapons, 
and the issue lies in the disagreement between proponents and opponents as 
to the role of the clause. While opponents like the HRW asserts that the legal 
review should take the clause into consideration, proponents like Schmitt and 
Thurnher mean on the other hand that the clause only applies in the absence 
of treaty law.  
 
HRW cites the ICJ which recognizes the clause as part of customary law, and 
also observes that the clause has “proved to be an effective means of 
addressing rapid evolution of military technology”.193 As such, the HRW, 
along with the ICRC, asserts that the clause should be taken into account in 
the legal review.194 Schmitt and Thurnher on the other hand are of the opinion 
that the clause only acts as a failsafe mechanism and is not meant to be 
considered an overarching principle that is required to be taken into 
consideration in every case. In their view, the legality of weapons is 
sufficiently covered in treaty law and therefore the clause does not merit 
consideration in the review process.195 Even if the applicability or non-
applicability of the Martens Clause is of no crucial importance in the debate 
on legality, the non-consensus on the matter nevertheless points to the deep 
disagreement that exists between the two sides. 
4.4 Compliance with Article 36 
The possible compliance or non-compliance is understandably an assessment 
that is not expected of the machine itself, but of the state developing and 
deploying it. Therefore, it is in regards to the compliance with Article 36, a 
matter of state responsibility in relation to international law and not the breach 
of international law by the weapon as such. Obviously, all states that are 
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parties to the AP I are bound by this obligation, but even though the customary 
law status of this obligation is not entirely clear, and non-party states therefore 
technically only have to ensure that new weapons are lawful before its use, 
many non-party states have these measures in place for review of new 
weapons, such as the US. The obligation to perform the legal review in 
general is confirmed in a DoD directive, stating that the acquisition and 
procurement of weapons and weapon systems shall be consistent with all 
applicable domestic and international law.196  
 
In the UK, this general obligation is found in their military manual, declaring 
that the weapon review process is conducted in a progressive manner as 
concepts for new means and methods of warfare are developed, and that it 
takes into account likely future developments in the law of armed conflict.197 
These are but two examples of states that in their military manuals or 
guidelines have included this obligation of performing the legal review of 
new weapons, and while practice of domestic regulations of the legal review 
of new weapons is not as widespread as desired, there are some good 
examples on how states have implemented the requirement of Article 36 in 
their domestic military regulation.198 
 
With regards to AWs, explicit mentioning of reviews are scarcer. The US 
directive of 2012 concerning AWs devotes one of its enclosures entirely to 
the guidelines for review of certain autonomous or semi-autonomous weapon 
systems, thus fulfilling the obligation of performing the legal review.199 The 
UK issued a Joint Doctrine Note on the UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems in March 2011, which states that legal review should continue to be 
part of the development cycle and must identify the legal, moral and ethical 
concerns in regards to the development of these new weapon systems.200 The 
continued compliance with Article 36 in regards to the development of AWs 
will also be a matter to discuss in the debate and the way forward. 
4.5 Accountability 
Initially, it is important to note the difference between accountability due to 
intentional breaches and accountability due to mistakes – clearly, in the case 
of a software programmer or commander programming or launching the AW 
to engage in actions that would amount to war crimes, that person would be 
held accountable for this intentional breach. However, the much more likely 
scenario is that of the robot itself making mistakes.201 In that case, in the 
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determination and attribution of responsibility over actions committed by an 
AW, there are several options of where the responsibility should be placed; 
the commander that deployed the AW, the programmer or the manufacturer 
that designed and produced the AW, the operator that supervises the actions 
of the AW, or even the AW itself. In much the same way as a military 
commander is not held accountable for the actions of his subordinates (except 
in exceptional circumstances as part of the command responsibility doctrine), 
as the human soldiers are autonomous beings, the attribution of responsibility 
on a commander of a fully autonomous weapon seems like an inappropriate 
idea.202 The application of the command responsibility doctrine would also 
prove insufficient, as this is based on the knowledge or possible knowledge203 
of the IHL-violation. In the case of a violation by an AW, this requirement of 
knowledge would fall on the fact that the commander is not the one 
responsible for programming the weapon.204  
 
If the violation committed by the AW instead is viewed as a technical fault, 
the responsibility would be attributed to the programmer or manufacturer, but 
also this proposal is ineffective, owing to the complete autonomy after the 
weapon has been deployed. If a weapon is construed in way that allows it to 
“feel” its surroundings, especially in a complex battlefield, and make own 
decisions based on this information, technical malfunctions will not be where 
the main problem lies. In addition, the criminal responsibility under IHL 
would only arise if the programmer acted intentionally, and if we are to 
attribute violations by the AW as a technical mishap, the responsibility for 
the programmer would fall here.205  
 
To attribute responsibility to the manufacturer could prove an even worse 
solution, as this could lead to the scenario where no manufacturer would be 
willing to produce these weapons at all, if they were to risk criminal liability 
for what the weapon might do in the battlefield.206 The proposal of holding 
the civilian software writer accountable on a civilian liability level may not 
be reasonable either. Marchant et al. sees the possibility of a software writer 
failing to code the machine sufficiently to e.g. recognize a civilian, and the 
machine then attacks civilians in a battlefield. In this scenario, Marchant 
means that “it is conceivable that the software writer of the code might be 
responsible for the mistaken actions”.207 This solution may be questioned on 
the basis that it is not reasonable that that amount of responsibility should lie 
with the civilian software writer, for them to have to imagine every 
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conceivable scenario of war in order to program the robot correctly, and 
escape individual liability.  
 
Furthermore, the scenario of one single software writer is becoming less and 
less probable, since programs today consist of millions of lines of codes put 
together by a team of programmers, each responsible for parts of the program 
but none being familiar with the entire program. In addition, with the 
increasing complexity of the machine, the risk of unexpected, not 
programmed behavior may arise, as a result of the sheer complexity of the 
program.208 Assuming that robots lack common sense or the contextual 
understanding required, even relatively sophisticated algorithms and software 
codes can be subject to failure when they face situations outside the design 
parameter they were intended for.209 In addition, all of the proposed solutions 
that involve holding an individual accountable, whether it be the software 
programmer, the manufacturer or the commander, has one major flaw – does 
it make sense to hold the human behind the machine accountable, when the 
machine by definition is designed to and supposed to calculate and reach 
decisions faster and better than a human being? In that case, obviously the 
human behind it could always refer to the better judgment of the machine, 
which is one of the reasons the machine was created for in the first place, one 
of the very raisons d’être of the machine.210  
 
Finally, assigning accountability to the machine itself is a possibility that has 
been discussed, although perhaps never as a serious solution. This is at the 
moment a dubious idea for several reasons – one being that it would be futile 
to punish the machine for a misconduct or breach of IHL, since it does not 
possess the capability to feel remorse or anything like it, nor any moral 
sensibility that would restrain it from repeating that misconduct.211 Robots 
today are far too underdeveloped to understand any kind of accountability on 
their part, as well as understanding or influencing their behavior in the 
future.212 Therefore, the point of attributing accountability to someone for an 
unwanted behavior, in order to prevent that behavior from recurring in the 
future, would be moot.213 This solution also entails the moral and ethical 
aspects discussed earlier214, and the very difficult question of whether or not 
a machine would have sufficient moral and ethical capacities in order to be 
considered a fully autonomous agent, that willingly and knowingly have 
performed this unwanted act or behavior.  
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4.6 Concluding Remarks 
First of all regarding the legality of AWs, it is true that AWs are not 
technically outlawed, since the terms “autonomous weapons” or “robots” do 
not appear anywhere in any prohibitive instruments. The problem lies perhaps 
not with the use of autonomous systems as such, such as patrolling or 
guarding systems, but when it comes to autonomous weapon systems, lethal 
autonomous robots capable of taking life-and-death decisions on their own – 
then we have a far more complicated situation.215  
 
The biggest and most important obstacle in the current debate on AWs is the 
fact that the technology is not yet developed or elaborated enough to be able 
to say anything for certain on the capability of AWs to adhere to the principles 
of IHL. The advocates on all sides of the debate are left with basing their 
arguments on what might happen in the future, regardless of how close or 
distant that future might be. In this approach, authors naturally choose the 
future view that would support their cause and arguments best. For example, 
Schmitt states that “there is no question that autonomous weapon systems 
could be programmed”216, while HRW emphasizes that “it is highly unlikely 
that a robot could be pre-programmed”217 and that e.g. value judgments 
“cannot be boiled down to a simple algorithm.”218  
 
In general, claims that support the development of AWs clearly assume that 
the technology is possible, but as a result, AWs may be prematurely 
introduced to the battlefield before the robotics and AI experts are even 
certain that strong AI capabilities can be produced.219 One of the major 
problems with this information-gap is that the international community is not 
in agreement of how AWs are to be treated until that information and 
knowledge is entirely clear. The question of if the laws of today are capable 
to deal with the changes in military technology (especially the question of the 
new actors on the battlefield, who actually is carrying out the fighting, if 
robots are considered tools of soldiers or soldiers in themselves)220 is not 
clear. Furthermore, the process of changing international law is so long and 
cumbersome that even if negotiations are held today, the legislation finally 
emanating from that is a legislation for the past, not the present and certainly 
not the future.221 One conceivable solution is that the international community 
could take command over these issues and start discussing AWs on an 
international arena, possibly through the forums of the UN or the Conference 
of Disarmament.  
 
If we were to disregard the uncertainty of development of technology for a 
second, there are still several other concerns that affect the legality of AWs 
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and the way they are being viewed and discussed in the current debate. One 
important issue that is frequently brought up in the discussion is the role 
emotions play in the battlefield – an argument used both by proponents and 
opponents. Proponents vehemently argue the benefits of having weapons in 
war that are not affected by human emotions; an AW would not get hungry 
or tired, would not have any sense of feelings such as revenge if the soldier 
next to it got killed, and no self-preservation. They would not let their 
judgment be clouded by emotional aspects, but be able to keep the assessment 
and information-processing as objective and unsullied as ever – perhaps 
allowing them to also use force less often.222 The lack of self-preservation 
would also mean that the AW could take more risks in the battlefield and 
therefore limit the amount of force being used.223 With fewer decisions made 
in the heat of the battle and clouded by emotions such as revenge, fear, panic 
or anger, AWs could possibly act more humane in war and therefore commit 
fewer war crimes than humans.224  
 
Arkin points out the dismal record in ethical behavior in the battlefield by 
human soldiers and the potential causes for war crimes; high losses in the own 
forces spurs revenge-seeking, high turnover in the chain of command leads to 
a weakened leadership, dehumanization of the enemy through using 
derogatory names, inexperienced, immature or poorly trained troops, external 
pressure of e.g. producing a high number of eliminated enemies, pleasure 
from power of killing or a sense of anger and frustration. He means that there 
is undoubtedly room for improvement and that AWs could be a help in 
addressing these problems.225 In addition, the removal of human soldiers from 
the battlefield would mean less mental health issues due to less exposure to 
violence and traumatizing events in war.  The statement by Gordon Johnson, 
member of the (now defunct) Pentagon’s Joint Forces Command is very 
telling for this point of view:  
 
They don’t get hungry. They’re not afraid. They don’t forget orders. They 
don’t care if the guy next to them has just been shot. Will they do a better job 
than humans? Yes.226 
 
But the use of weapons that does not have emotions – is that necessarily a 
good thing? No revenge, sure, but no compassion, empathy or intuition 
either? The importance of these human emotions and qualities cannot be 
exaggerated. HRW notes that even if human-like cognition in AWs became 
feasible, they would still lack certain human qualities such as emotions, 
compassion and the ability to understand other human beings, and therefore, 
human oversight of AWs would in any case be a necessity to ensure the 
protection of civilians as well as combatants in times of armed conflict.227 In 
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addition, it could even be conceived that emotions are necessary in order to 
make ethical judgments, and that a machine that is not capable of feeling 
compassion for the sufferings of others, is not capable of making good moral 
or ethical decisions.228 Of all human emotions robots lack, one of the more 
important is the skill of reasoning. Calculating and estimating is not the same 
as reasoning, and reasoning applies both to reasoning on their own, but also 
reasoning with others. The problem of unanticipated situations that arise is 
often mentioned in the debate and the capability of robots to cope with these 
situations is discussed. While unanticipated situations would be the same for 
human as well as robot soldiers, in the event of such a situation, the human 
soldier would be able to reason his way to the best solution, and to reevaluate 
and adapt the actions in the new situation in accordance with the changed 
conditions, a quality that robots, presumably, does not possess. 
 
While proponents continue to argue that the absence of emotions will make 
the battlefield more humane and emphasize the shortcomings of humans in 
war (such as mentioned human fallibilities, lower response times and 
fatigue)229, opponents instead stress the importance of human qualities such 
as showing kindness, mercy and compassion, factors that can restrain the use 
of force in the battlefield.230 In general, it feels as though the proponents, not 
so much overestimates the capabilities of AWs, but underestimates the 
capabilities of humans! In their arguments on how and why machines will be 
able to outperform human soldiers, there seems to be very limited amount of 
consideration and more importantly, value, of how human soldiers in an 
instant can read the body language, facial expression, atmosphere and other 
relevant factors of a possible target, and in an instant is capable of deciding 
the status of that target as lawful or unlawful.  
 
As mentioned earlier in regards to the development of artificial 
intelligence,231 the capability to read contexts is conceivably something that 
only humans are capable of, and the human factor in assessments and 
application of law is possibly inimitable. The interpretation of international 
law is based on context, social norms and judgment, and qualities like that are 
extremely difficult for a robot to mimic, if possible at all. In addition, humans 
are far superior to machines or computers when it comes to managing 
information that is incomplete, contradictory or unformatted and to make 
decisions when it is hard to foresee the possible outcomes or consequences of 
a certain scenario of actions.232  
 
Another issue that is often mentioned against AWs is the technological 
weaknesses associated with them, such as framing problems and weak 
software. The framing problem is related to the difficulties in AI and 
programming, specifically, how the robot interacts with its environment in 
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relation to how  any given situation was represented in that robot. This 
problem arise from the desire of not having to write endless codes and 
formulas to describe the effects caused by certain actions which would render 
the robot too slow to be militarily useful. This would result in a robot that is 
prone to use force indiscriminately or disproportionately as it often would 
miss important information or misinterpret situations.233  
 
The problem with weak software is where the software becomes more and 
more complex and therefore possibly less and less reliable, safe and 
trustworthy. If the existence of a reliable software, programmed into the AWs, 
is the safeguard for a robot to act in a way that would be in compliance with 
the mentioned principles of IHL, as well as moral and ethical considerations, 
then the risk of problems with weak software, or technical glitches in the 
software, is a risk not worth taking.234 Could a machine actually look at the 
big picture, not just identifying if an individual is a threat, but understand the 
context and everything around it, and would it be able to read human emotions 
and understand them? Other suggestions put forth to justify the use of AWs 
are that the machines could be programmed to use force only when there is 
zero doubt. While this is a nice idea in theory, practice shows that in warfare, 
there is never zero doubt. This approach would therefore render the weapon 
impractical and unusable in the actual battlefield. Another idea is that AWs 
would be programmed to never fire first, to only return fire. Again, this is 
feasible in theory, but in a battlefield it would not be a practical solution. The 
same goes for the suggestion to never use AWs when civilians are around, 
because nowadays, civilians are rarely completely absent from the 
battlefields.  
 
Clearly, a large amount of issues still remains regarding both the legality and 
morality of developing and using AWs, and the disagreements regarding 
these many aspects are not easily resolved. Despite of all uncertainties and 
concerns, as well as all arguments put forth both in support of and against 
AWs, the fact still remains that they are being developed and researched, and 
the issue then becomes how we are to move forward. 
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5 Regulate or Terminate: 
Regulating the Terminator 
Having reached the conclusion that it might not be possible today to conclude 
anything decisive about the possibilities or capabilities of AWs to comply 
with the rules of IHL, the subsequent question then becomes how we are to 
treat them. As far as IHL is concerned, perhaps we need to think about a more 
creative and forward thinking approach to how we interpret and apply these 
principles if we want them to remain relevant. However, we also need to 
remember that the law might not always be the answer, and in certain areas 
(such as the present one with AWs), sometimes arguments from policy 
perspectives and ethical aspects are stronger than legal rules when it comes 
to dealing with lethal decisions made by robots.235 The most pressing need 
now is to acknowledge that the problems surrounding AWs exist, thus 
legitimating it as an international concern, drawing attention of relevant 
experts and in doing so, demonstrate that the international community is 
taking the issue seriously.  
 
While it is clear that not enough is known about the potential risks of AWs, 
waiting for the technology to develop could mean that it might be too late to 
undertake any meaningful regulations because the commercial drive behind 
the technology would be too strong and rooted.236 Jürgen Altmann, military 
nanotechnology expert, expresses concerns over the proliferation of AWs and 
warns that unmanned, remote-controlled systems could be deployed in high 
numbers and could thereafter relatively simply and covertly be changed into 
autonomous systems.237 The fact that military robotics technology is moving 
forward at an unprecedented pace is a point of concern when it comes to the 
implementation of an international regulation in order to both ensure the 
sufficient protection of civilians, but also to prevent the development of a 
dynamic that could possibly upset existing strategic balances, something that 
could result in the destabilization of the entire international system.238  
5.1 An Outright Ban 
The call for an outright ban on the development and use of autonomous 
weapons was made already in 2009 by the newly founded organization 
International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC). The organization 
promotes the prohibition of the development, deployment and use of armed 
AWSs and states that machines should not be allowed to make killing 
decisions.239 Among the founders of ICRAC are Noel Sharkey, Peter Asaro 
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and Robert Sparrow, and the members consists of experts in robotics 
technology, robot ethics, international relations, international security, arms 
control, international humanitarian law and international human rights law.240 
As of October 2013, the organization had gathered more than 270 computer 
scientists, engineers, AI experts, roboticists and others, representing 37 
countries, in its call to ban AWs.241  
 
In 2012, HRW and the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law 
School (IHRC) issued the same call, and recommended all states to prohibit 
the development, production and use of fully autonomous weapons through 
an internationally binding legal instrument.242 HRW was shortly after one of 
the leading forces behind the launch of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots 
in April 2013, an international coalition of NGOs working to ban fully 
autonomous weapons.243 These three represent the largest forces behind the 
call to ban AWs, and they all propose the same solution: the implementation 
a pre-emptive and comprehensive ban on the development and use of fully 
autonomous weapons, something that would be achieved through an 
international legally binding instrument, as well as implementation in 
domestic laws and other measures. The call for a ban is based on concerns 
about taking humans out of the loop when it comes to targeting and firing, 
essentially killing, decisions. Concerns also relate to the possible 
consequences of letting autonomous weapons develop and proliferate freely 
without any international control or overview.  
 
The argument most vehemently put forward is that it would be irresponsible 
to simply wait and see, and the opponents stress the need to initiate an 
international ban before too many states develop the technology and we 
“venture down a path from which there is no return”, as Sharkey puts it.244 
HRW in particular also stresses the threat that AWs would pose to civilians 
in times of war, and that a ban would ensure that the targeting and firing 
decisions are always carried out by a human soldier, capable of adhering to 
the principles of IHL.245 Asaro points out several benefits of introducing a 
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binding legal treaty (besides clarifying the international community’s stand 
on AWs) including to avoid a slippery slope towards AWs, to shape future 
investments in technology development and to establish the legal principle 
that autonomous systems are not sufficiently morally capable to make life and 
death decisions about humans. According to this, a ban would be desirable in 
order to protect human rights, as well as other norms protecting individuals.246  
 
However, there is the concern from proponents of AWs that a ban might 
disrupt the development of a weapon that is possibly more capable than 
humans of respecting legal and moral norms, and that it would disregard the 
potential for a weapon that could minimize harm to civilians.247 Schmitt even 
argues that it would be irresponsible to ban AWs at this early stage of 
development, as this would disregard the possible advantages that AWs might 
have on warfare, such as the possibility to attack an enemy without risk for 
the attacker. He also contend that the development is not yet at a point where 
we can conclude if AWs are more or less harmful than human operated 
systems. The argument here is that it would be irresponsible not to wait and 
see what possible benefits the development of AWs might have for future 
warfare.248  
 
In light of this, some authors propose alternative approaches, where AWs are 
regulated through a framework convention, rules of procedures, policies or 
directives. These proposals emphasizes the view that with incremental 
development of AWs, the regulation of acceptable use should also be 
incremental.249 The biggest obstacle however, is the lack of political will, 
when one of the main motivations for developing AWs is just that, generating 
political will for warfare, by removing combatants from the heat of battle. 
While there are successful precedents of NGOs campaigning leading to a 
prohibitive convention,250 the feasibility of such a convention in the case of 
AWs is probably significantly lower, judging by the difference in military 
advantage and effectiveness between landmines and AWs. States that have a 
lot to win by the development of AWs will surely not be prepared to sign a 
treaty banning the development or use of these weapons, so the proposition 
might fall on its own unreasonableness. Instead of imposing a prohibition of 
AWs altogether, more and more authors propose the solution of negotiating a 
sort of framework convention, an arms control agreement.  
5.2 Adoption Within the Frames of CCW 
While it has traditionally been weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that have 
received the overwhelming part of international arms control attention, 
conventional weapons are becoming increasingly sophisticated and military 
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effective and could soon be no less important to control and regulate than 
WMDs. Therefore, it could be important to bring AWs, which are currently 
only indirectly (or possibly insufficiently) covered by treaties, onto the 
agenda of international arms control before things get out of hand.251  
 
The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
was drafted in October 1980 and seeks to prohibit or restrict the use of certain 
conventional weapons which are considered excessively injurious or has 
indiscriminate effects. It is an annex to the GCs and contains five protocols, 
each of which regulates one type of weapon; weapons with non-detectable 
fragments, landmines and booby traps, incendiary weapons, blinding laser 
weapons and clearance of explosive remnants of war. The aim of the 
convention is to provide additional protection for civilians as well as 
combatants for injuries caused by weapons not sufficiently covered by the 
GCs and APs.252  
 
One significant feature of the CCW is the possibility to expand it and adopt 
additional protocols to respond to the development of new weapons. This 
means that any state party may suggest an additional protocol to be added, 
and a conference may then be held to discuss the proposition.253 This 
particular feature of the CCW is what has attracted recent considerable 
attention in relation to AWs, especially from NGOs such as ICRAC and the 
Stop Killer Robots campaign, and its coalition members. In November 2013, 
these two NGOs motioned to bring the issue on the agenda for the Conference 
of the State Parties for the CCW, and on 15 November, the Conference 
decided to convene a Meeting of Experts on 13-16 May 2014 for their first 
ever meeting discussing questions related to AWs.254 The agenda for the 
Meeting of Experts includes discussions on technical issues, ethics and 
sociology and legal aspects. The legal aspects in particular, address issues 
relating to implications for the principle of humanity and the Martens Clause, 
the impacts on the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, 
the compatibility of AWs and Article 36 and finally the impact on issues of 
responsibility and accountability for violations of international law.255 The 
outcome of that meeting will then be discussed at the next Conference of the 
State Parties in November 2014.256 A possible outcome of this process could 
lead to a negotiation which in turn could lead to a new protocol for the CCW, 
which could then either ban or at the very least, regulate the development and 
deployment of AWs.  
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Krishnan notes that the international community could benefit immensely 
from adopting some kind of arms control which would prevent or at least slow 
down the arms race in military robotics and the proliferation of these 
weapons. With the need to contain the potentially very negative consequences 
of this increasingly advanced technology on international security, a 
regulation could prevent a situation in which self-evolving autonomous 
defense systems develops in a way that in the long run could possibly threaten 
the very existence of humanity.257  
5.3 Soft Law Governance 
While the idea of a hard law regulation, both in terms of a pre-emptive ban 
and a regulation within the CCW, might be a good idea in theory, again it 
might not be practicable due to the problem of political will. With all 
international treaties, there is always the problem of the state having to give 
something up on a national level, for the good of the international community, 
whether it is the state restricting its free trade in order to protect the 
environment, or making sure the state complies with its human rights 
obligations in order to receive aid. With this in mind, it is not hard to see the 
reluctance of states to sign and ratify international treaties that directly 
restrains the decisiveness of the state, especially when it comes to the 
capability to develop its military forces and the protection and security of the 
very state itself. In addition, limitations such as the resources and time needed 
for negotiations, difficulties in enforcement and compliance, and lack of 
flexibility in international instruments makes this traditional model less and 
less realistic. In that case, an alternative approach based on soft law might 
prove more appropriate.258  
 
While soft law has the distinct disadvantage of not being formally binding 
and non-enforceable, instead it has the advantages of being more flexible, 
capable of a more speedily launch and more easily adaptable to changes in 
both technology and the political and social scene. Marchant et al. suggests 
that some of the methods applied in other areas of emerging technologies 
possibly could be applied to military technology as well,259 including codes 
of conduct, transgovernmental dialogue, information sharing and confidence-
building measures.  
 
Codes of conduct – non-binding general guidelines that defines the 
responsible, ethical behavior – has the advantage of being able to be 
developed and implemented by various entities in society, including 
governmental agencies, industries, NGOs, scientific societies etc., and they 
may be important as a first step in providing some protection and governance 
until more formal instruments can be negotiated. While codes can be created 
rather quickly compared to more formal instruments, the biggest downside is 
the difficulty in application, and if there are multiple codes for one area, there 
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is no clear hierarchy of which code takes precedence over another. Recently, 
codes of conduct have been created for research projects on synthetic biology 
and nanotechnology, areas that might have potential for military application. 
Although a code of conduct might not be enough to completely regulate the 
area of AWs, it could certainly be a step forward in creating a common goal 
for such a regulation.260  
 
Transgovernmental dialogues are more informal and flexible arrangements 
between government officials from different countries who discuss and 
coordinate policies and they have become increasingly common in areas that 
concerns international coordination, such as national security issues. This 
provides a forum where information and best practices can be shared in the 
pursuit of harmonization of policies and enforcement practices, and these 
dialogues can greatly enhance cooperation and influence policy outcomes in 
the international arena. As this method also proves effective in starting a 
discussion among policymakers from different countries, starting 
transgovernmental dialogues could also be an important step towards more 
concrete policy measures in the future.261  
 
The concept of information sharing and confidence-building measures first 
arose in the area of international relations and have frequently been used in 
international conflicts as initial measures in order to reduce hostilities and to 
enhance stability, trust and security. Within the scope of AWs, these kind of 
measures could consist of either unilateral or multilateral initiatives, and 
nations could commit to a limited moratorium262 on the deployment of AWS, 
as well as commit to share information on technical issues and agree to host 
international conferences to discuss the issue of AWs.263  
                                                 
260 Ibid., pp. 307-310. 
261 Ibid., pp. 311-313.  
262 Arkin supports the idea of a moratorium to ensure that technology meets international 
standards, Arkin (2013), p. 5. 
263 Marchant et al. (2011), p. 313. 
 60 
6 Reflections 
In April 1978 an international panel of experts convened to discuss the issue 
of “should weapons of dubious legality be developed?”, shortly after the 
adoption of the two APs in 1977.264 The same questions that were discussed 
in that panel are the ones that are being discussed today regarding the 
development of autonomous weapons. If we cannot be sure of the legality of 
a weapon, should we really allow the development of that weapon to 
continue? In this very new but quickly polarized debate, the positions seem 
to have reached a stalemate. It is clear that we cannot conclude anything 
decisive about the legality of AWs, their ability to comply with the rules of 
IHL, before we know if the technology is actually possible, if we can actually 
develop a strong enough AI that will be able to respect the rules of IHL. While 
the debate between proponents and opponents continues, the international 
community must start to take a stand on how these weapons are to be treated.  
 
It is safe to say that increasingly autonomous systems and robots are here to 
stay – their usefulness in many areas in our society are undeniable and far too 
great to be underestimated. Already, autonomous machines have already 
started to carry out meaningful tasks, such as sifting through the wreckage at 
Ground Zero after 9/11265, delivering cargo to operating bases266, or with the 
ability to function as Medbots or Searchbots267, or even used in the civil 
society as advanced nursing or elder-care robots268. However, this use of 
autonomous systems are far from the use of autonomous weapon systems, 
weapon systems that in effect will make life-and-death decisions in the 
battlefield – a distinction that is often ignored or at least overlooked. Taking 
this decision-making power out of the hands of humans and placing it in a 
machine will have enormous moral and ethical consequences, and could even 
affect the way the legality of the weapon is being considered. Ultimately, a 
limit must be drawn where what is military advantageous, comes to a point 
where we lose humanity in warfare.  
 
If the analysis of the legality of AWs would consist only of considerations of 
military effectiveness, it would be easy to see the appeal of developing more 
and more autonomous weapon systems which would replace humans in the 
battlefield and thus completing the seemingly unattainable goal of entirely 
distancing humans from the actual battle – machines would not get tired, 
hungry, wounded, affected by emotions, they would not need salary, 
pensions, insurances. The military advantages that AWs could pose in filling 
the roles of the three Ds – dull, dirty or dangerous – are strong arguments in 
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favor of the use of AWs.269 But the development of more and more 
autonomous weapons could lead down a path that today only seems as science 
fiction or popular culture – the similarities to Star Wars, Terminator, Robocop 
and others are uncanny – but that could be reality in only a few decades. What 
if the development slips out of our hands, out of human control? A weapon 
that is instructed to learn and adapt through its mistakes could eventually 
evolve into an unpredictable, virtually indestructible, killer machine.270 All of 
these, possible but more or less probable, scenarios for the future, might seem 
overly exaggerated today, but the seemingly beneficial and simple action of 
removing humans from the battlefield has the very real and disconcerting 
effect of making the wars easier to enter and easier to wage. Replacing 
humans with robots could have two important implications – the shift of the 
burden of war to civilians, a real risk especially in the context of today’s 
asymmetric warfare,271 and most importantly – lowering the threshold of war. 
The turn to AWs alters the political calculations of war, the prospect of being 
able to wage a war without the risk of casualties in the own forces would 
remove one of the greatest deterrents of war.272 In removing this biggest 
disincentive to start wars, we could be seeing a future of warfare where 
nations are more and more prone to use armed force, because the costs are so 
much lower than they ever would be with human soldiers.273  
 
If we were to witness, with the rise of autonomous weapons, the emergence 
of an entire industrialization of warfare with clean-killing battlefields where 
hi-tech countries fight each other without risk to their own forces – a battle of 
technology – a battle between robots – then this emerging technology and 
autonomous weapons could be accepted. But as this science fiction-utopian 
scenario is more than highly unlikely, we are left with the scenario where 
some hi-tech countries are in possession of these weapons and will use them 
against human soldiers, and will use them in contemporary battle-spaces 
where combatants blend in together with civilians. In this scenario, as well as 
the scenarios of war we have witnessed for centuries (and are witnessing 
today), civilians will be caught in between and come to harm. In these, far 
more likely scenarios, it is obvious that the protection of civilians must 
continue to be a priority and that considerations of this must be taken when 
discussing the legality of AWs.  
 
While current efforts to create these kinds of new legal regimes for weapons 
are increasingly led by states that have a low likelihood of ever using these 
weapon systems in combat or by NGOs,274 it is also increasingly clear that 
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the introduction of autonomous weapons on the battlefield is something that 
engages and upsets the international community. Instead of allowing the 
unregulated development and deployment of AWs into the battlefields, a 
compromise could possibly be reached, where the technology that is being 
developed, instead of being programmed into self-governing machines, is 
being used as aid and assistance for human soldiers. That way, combatants 
and civilians would still be able to benefit from all the distinct advantages that 
the ever-improving technology provides, without relinquishing the essential 
factor of human decision-making. Using the machines as aids and tools 
instead, would also sidestep the moral and ethical obstacles that arises in 
changing the agents of war from humans to robots. Again, if we do not know 
exactly what it is that makes us humans, we cannot know exactly what it 
means for the application of the rules of IHL if we remove the human factor. 
This is an additional point of concern in the development of AWs – what 
happens to the actual application of IHL if we change the actors in the 
battlefield? Are the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution 
even applicable? Or do we need a completely new set of rules that applies to 
the use of robots in the warfare, principles and rules that will regulate this 
new form of war? I personally do not believe it will come to this even with 
the rapid development of AWs, but the fact that we do not know how IHL 
applies if we are to change the agents in war should be considered in the 
current and coming debate. 
 
So far, the debate has already engaged some of the world’s most highly 
regarded scientists, authors and experts, on both sides of the debate. One 
interesting factor in the debate is that some of the world’s most noteworthy 
professors and military experts have chosen the opposing side of the debate, 
the side that argues against the development and use of AWs, and have also 
gone to the lengths of creating an NGO that actively works for the prohibition 
of these weapons. Even if this circumstance does not say anything substantial 
about the legality of AWs, I think that this position does say something about 
the character of these weapons and of how we should be treating them. To my 
knowledge, since the call for banning landmines, no weapon has spawned this 
much international attention, a circumstance I find worth noting. In addition, 
on the other side of the debate, the proponents, we find that the most vocal 
advocates are scientists and experts are actually employed by the US 
military!275 If anything would call the arguments from the side of the 
proponents into question, it is the fact that these advocates actually have own 
interests in the debate.  
 
The other thing that disturbs me when having analyzed the debate and the 
many articles, pleas, editorials and viewpoints expressed, is the fact that the 
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debate seems to have boiled down into a clear-cut, plain discussion on 
legality, while at the same time, the parties to the discussion are well aware 
that we cannot yet say anything for certain on the legality, since we cannot 
yet see the full development of autonomous weapon systems. As a soon-to-
be international lawyer, yes, legality is important and it is the focus of this 
thesis, but I do find it alarming that the debate seems to have come to the 
point of legality, and stopped there. It is disquieting that issues such as 
morality and ethicality of using robots as soldiers, of changing the very agents 
of war, of letting machines make life-and-death decisions, that these questions 
have so far been extremely overlooked in the debate. In several of the articles 
used for this thesis, the issue of morality pops up once every now and then, 
indicating that there are concerns on this point, but at the same time showing 
the unwillingness or inability to discuss these matters in a satisfactory 
manner. It is clearly difficult to discuss moral and ethics, especially in the 
context of war, but at the moment, the vital part is just to make sure that these 
issues are taken into consideration, and to widen the scope of the assessment 
to not just encompass the legality and military effectiveness of these possible 
weapons, but to also encompass moral and ethics. As argued above, I believe 
that there is room for the moral issues to become part of the legality evaluation 
as well, e.g. to the extent of where IHL is still applicable if we change the 
agents in war, and the issue of accountability, for the same reason. 
 
However, the aspect of this debate that I find most important to bring into the 
coming considerations, conferences, debates or discussions on the legality of 
AWs, is the bigger picture of future warfare. While the balance between scary 
and advantageous must be maintained until we know more, the considerations 
of what consequences might come from introducing AWs onto the battlefield, 
cannot wait. This argument deserves some extra weight in the debate – by 
removing humans from war, we also remove the biggest disincentive for war 
altogether. In these discussions, we, the international community, must ask 
ourselves if this is the view of war and use of armed force we want to see for 
the future? All studies on humanitarian law and peacebuilding are based on 
the idea that wars are of evil and that we should do everything humanity can 
to refrain from it, but would the use of AWs really further this cause? Or 
would it in fact move in the opposite direction?  
 
Yes, wars are changing. With regards to this particular change, perhaps it is 
too early for us to say anything definitively on the legality of autonomous 
weapons. It is however not one day too soon to be talking about how we are 
to treat the development of increasingly autonomous weapons, and with each 
week comes new developments and improvements in the field of military 
technology and with that, new legal and moral challenges. What now lies 
before us is for us to decide whether we are to direct the technology ahead of 
us or if we are to let the technology direct us. Us directing the technology 
could possibly lead to more humane wars with more precise attacks on 
combatants and less collateral damage on civilians. Technology directing us 
could instead lead to a decreased humanity in warfare and, ultimately, us 
losing control over the way future wars are waged.  
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